Exploitation of existing Voice over Internet Protocol Technology for Department of the Navy application by Shafley, William K.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2001-09
Business architecture model for network centric
surface combatant land attack warfare
Shafley, William K.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2938
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
THESIS 
BUSINESS ARCHITECTURE MODEL FOR NETWORK 










 Thesis Advisor:   Erik Jansen 
 Associate Advisor: Floyd Brock 




 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
September 2001 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Business Architecture Model for Network Centric 
Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare 
6. AUTHOR(S)   William K. Shafley 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION  REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE   
ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Land attack is a major mission area for the surface navy in the coming years.  High levels of complexity characterize 
the land attack environment of 2015. The purpose of this research is to generate an understanding of the warfare architecture the 
land attack C4ISR-T systems will support.  The Business Architecture Model for Network Centric Surface Combatant Land 
Attack Warfare depicts a networked resource structure of sensor, weapons, and decision makers that are transformed in a value 
added engagement process to achieve land attack goals.  This structure was developed using the Eriksson-Penker Business 
Extensions Tool-Kit for the Unified Modeling Language (UML).  The Eriksson-Penker Business View comprises the Business 
Vision, the Business Structure, the Business Process, and the Business Behavior. The Business Model for Network Centric 
Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare uses this structure to view the land attack warfare architecture in terms of goals and 
problems, resources, processes and events, and system wide behavior. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
117 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Command and Control Systems, Network Centric Warfare, Surface Warfare, 
Information Age Warfare, Unified Modeling Language (UML), Application software--Development, 
Business--Data processing, Strategic Planning, Organizational Change 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















































Land attack is a major mission area for the surface navy in the coming years.  
High levels of complexity characterize the land attack environment of 2015. The purpose 
of this research is to generate an understanding of the warfare architecture the land attack 
C4ISR-T systems will support.  The Business Architecture Model for Network Centric 
Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare depicts a networked resource structure of 
sensor, weapons, and decision makers that are transformed in a value added engagement 
process to achieve land attack goals.  This structure was developed using the Eriksson-
Penker Business Extensions Tool Kit for the Unified Modeling Language (UML).  The 
Eriksson-Penker Business View comprises the Business Vision, the Business Structure, 
the Business Process, and the Business Behavior. The Business Model for Network 
Centric Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare uses this structure to view the land 
attack warfare architecture in terms of goals and problems, resources, processes and 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The United States military stands at the brink of a revolution in military affairs 
brought about by the speed and complexity of the information age. Documents such as 
Joint Vision 2020 have crafted a vision of 21st-century warfare that incorporates precision 
engagement, dominant maneuver, full-spectrum protection, and focused logistics. This 
vision is made possible by a global information grid supporting the war fighter with 
timely, relevant, and secure information to enable a fully networked force of sensors, 
weapons, and decision makers. 
For the United States Navy and Marine Corps, the mission of providing sovereign 
power forward remains a vital tool in the conduct of the nation's foreign policy.  
Forward… from the Sea and Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) describe the 
roles and missions of the nation's sea-based forces.  The Navy's key responsibilities in the 
"…post-Cold War environment are to influence events ashore by peacetime forward 
presence, by direct power projection, by ensuring access to the littorals for joint 
expeditionary forces, and by actively supporting those forces in crisis and in war." 
(SWM, May/Jun 2000, p. 5) OMFTS defines a vision for operations of Marine Corps 
units applying maneuver warfare concepts to joint operations in the littoral environment. 
"…[S]ea-based Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) [will] bypass key centers of 
resistance by using the sea as maneuver space to move rapidly against operational 
objectives, by keeping the enemy off balance by maintaining a high operational tempo." 
(SWM, May/Jun 2000, p. 5).  While the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to conduct 
prompt and sustained combat operations at sea, the forces that put to sea in 2015 will bear 
little resemblance in terms of equipment, speed, and agility to those ships, sailors, and 
marines on deployment today. 
The Surface Warfare Vision for 2015 and beyond encompasses the traditional 
roles of naval action: air, surface, and undersea warfare.  Maritime Dominance forms the 
foundation for the entry into the 21st-century joint battle space.  It is a condition achieved 
by an unequalled capability to command the seas and project power ashore.  Two mission 
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areas, land attack and theater air dominance, enable its achievement.  Maritime 
Dominance demands a robust and joint-interoperable command, control, 
communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and targeting (C4ISR-T) system.  
A C4ISR-T system is a tool used by commanders in conducting command and control to 
provide data and information in many forms with differing degrees of latency to various 
units allowing them to sense, to decide, and to act.  It is an information system designed 
to provide commanders and operators with relevant data and information to conduct their 
missions.  
Land attack borrows much from the traditions of sea combat.  The complexities it 
brings to the battle space require a detailed examination of the processes involved to 
determine the requirements to be placed upon new C4ISR-T systems under development. 
Land attack warfare conducted using networks of sensors, weapons, and decision makers 
provides a method to conduct command and control in complex environments.  Network 
centric land attack requires a C4ISR-T system that integrates sensors, weapons, and 
decision makers in an operating environment and provides system users the ability to 
participate at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of conflict.  
B. METHODOLOGY 
Architecture makes it possible to understand the structure being built.  
Architecting an information system begins with an understanding of the business the 
system supports. By basing architecture on a common business model, several 
advantages are achieved:  
• Information systems become an integral part of the overall business, 
supporting the business and enhancing the work and the results. 
• Information systems integrate easily with each other and can share or 
exchange information. 
• Information systems can be updated and modified as changes to the 
business model are promulgated. (Eriksson and Penker, 15) 
In Business Modeling with UML-Business Patterns at Work, Hans-Erik Eriksson 
and Magnus Penker describe a business using four broad concepts: 
• Resources - The objects within the business such as people, material, 
information, or products that are used or produced in the business. 
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• Processes - The activities performed within the business that changes the 
state of business resources.  
• Goals - The purpose of the business or the outcome the business as a 
whole is trying to achieve. 
• Rules - Statements that define or constrain some aspect of the business and 
represent business knowledge. 
These four business concepts can be represented in a model that shows their 
interrelationship.  The model depicts how the business processes achieve goals through 
the use of resources and rules.  The C4ISR-T system architecture necessary to support 
land attack warfare requires an understanding of the business model it supports.  This 
model is created using the Eriksson-Penker Business Extensions of the Unified Modeling 
Language (UML).  The Eriksson-Penker extensions comprise four views of the business:   
The Business Vision: A view that describes a goals structure for the company 
and illustrates problems that must be solved to reach those goals.   
The Business Structure: A view that depicts the structure among the resources in 
the business. 
The Business Process: A view that represents the activities and values created in 
the business and illustrates the interaction between processes and resources to 
achieve the goal of each process. 
The Business Behavior: A view that shows the behavior of each important 
resource process in the business model. 
The Land Attack Business Architecture is developed using these views.  Each 
view is examined as models in the following chapters.  Methods specific to each model 
are indicated in their corresponding chapters.  Each chapter explains the model in terms 
of its relationship to the Unified Modeling Language and includes a description of the 
objects and classes.  The models are then applied to the land attack mission area.  The 
specific information regarding land attack warfare for all four views is gathered from the 
Concept of Operations for Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare 2005-2015 
(CONOPS).  The CONOPS was published in February 2001 as a draft publication to 
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solicit dialogue on its content from users and contractors.  Appendices for each model 
include the UML diagrams and their explanations. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What is the business architecture for land attack warfare using the Eriksson-
Penker Business Views and their UML Extensions? 
D. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is presented in four chapters, each with a corresponding appendix.  
The four chapters cover each of the Eriksson-Penker Business Views.  The corresponding 
UML diagrams are found in each appendix.  Conclusions and summary are located at the 





















II. BUSINESS VISION VIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A land attack C4ISR-T system integrates sensor, decision-maker, and weapon 
nodes in the operating environment.  The development of land attack C4ISR-T systems 
requires not only an understanding of this environment but also the factors that affect it. 
Organization, technology, and doctrine shape the environment. Describing its 
complexities requires frequent changes in perspective.  The Business Vision view relates 










Figure (1-1) - The Land Attack Environment 
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The context for the application of the goal/problem model is the Surface 
Combatant Land Attack Concept of Operations: Roles, Missions, and Employment 
Considerations.  The goal/problem model describes the primary business goals and 
relates them to specific problems showing constraints in their achievement.  With the 
problems determined in the goal/problem model, they are also discussed in terms of their 
description, causes, prerequisites for solving them, and actions necessary to begin the 
process of providing proposed solutions. 
1. Goal Problem Model Description 
A goal/problem model is a UML object diagram depicting objects and their 
relationships.  The goal/problem diagram breaks down high-level goals (super-goals) into 
sub-goals.  Objects in this diagram demonstrate the dependencies between goals, the 
relationships between them, and the problems associated with achieving them. (Eriksson 
and Penker, 99).  The goal/problem model depicts a specific goal as an object of the goal 
class. Super-goals are completely or partially broken down into sub-goals.  The 
goal/problem model also describes the obstacles to achieving the business goal in the 
form of problems.  Problems are temporary, in that they can be solved once and for all, or 
permanent, in that they can only be mitigated.  Action plans are developed for problems 
in the form of causes, actions to solve, prerequisites for those actions, and processes 
required.  A more detailed description and application of the goal/problem model are 
found in Appendix A.  
B. LAND ATTACK GOAL-PROBLEM MODEL 
1. Goal Identification  
The Surface Combatant Land Attack Concept of Operations: Roles, Missions, and 
Employment Considerations provides the desired goals for land attack warfare.  The 
overarching goal is an "integrated employment of available sensors, weapons, and joint 
and coalition forces for projecting combat power into and on the ground portion of the 
battle space to protect vital national interests and achieve national and military 
objectives."  (CONOPS, 1-1)  Achieving this goal requires a fully integrated land attack 
capability.  An integrated land attack capability allows for "sensor to weapons on-target" 
timeline for time critical targets and near-real time battle space deconfliction.  
Commanding officers must have situational awareness of a multi-warfare tactical picture 
and control over ship's resources in the operating area.   
The integrated land attack capability requires commanding officers to execute 
land attack missions at all levels of conflict: strategic, operational, and tactical.  Missions 
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are conducted at the lowest echelon possible in the chain of command to achieve 
simplicity in execution. An integrated land attack capability provides the joint force 
commander a sea-based force considered the primary means to engage the adversary.  
The force should be offensive and integrated in a network-centric architecture, providing 
the commander with dynamically allocated firepower.  Appendix A provides more details 
and description of the Land Attack Goal Structure. 
2. Problem Identification  
There are three problems facing associated with achieving a fully integrated land 
attack capability: 
• The level of environmental complexity must be determined.  
• The land attack organization is not structured to operate efficiently in the 
complex land attack environment.  
• Platform-centric doctrine does not provide the flexibility and speed of 
command required to operate in the complex land attack environment.   
VADM Arthur Cebrowski, former President of the Naval War College, and Dr. 
John Garstka have provided a model that aids in identifying environmental complexities. 
The model proposes a relationship between the environment and the factors that interact 
with it: organization, doctrine, and technology. (Figure 1-2)  Technology, in this case 
consisting of weapons, ships, sensors, or networks, forms the base of the triangle.  On one 
side is doctrine, such as rules of engagement and commander’s intent, which describe the 
rules and constraints affecting the use of technology.  Organization, which determines 
how technology is used, is on the third side.  This model is used to provide the actions, 
prerequisites, and processes required in solving the problems associated with achieving 







Figure (1-2) – Cebrowski and Garstka Model (From, C.R. Jones, Class Notes, CC3000) 
The following sections identify environmental complexity and contain a 
discussion on doctrine and organizational solutions.  The problem models and 
descriptions can be found in Appendix A. 
a. Three Levels of Environmental Complexity 
The integrated land attack capability depends on managing the land attack 
environment.  Managing the land attack environment requires an understanding of where 
the complexities exist.  Three views describe the environmental complexities.  An 
integrated land attack capability is achieved in the context of an increasingly complicated 
geopolitical situation.  The physical operating environment and the tasks associated with 
conducting land attack (force protection, deconfliction, and engaging targets) introduce 
more complexity.  Advances in technology affect complexity at the unit level. 
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(1) A Macro View.  The macro-environment is the 
geopolitical system affecting future conflict.  The information age is characterized by 
invigorated competition, lowered barriers of entry into the global market, and the 
elimination, or reduction, in the competitive advantage most countries and businesses 
have enjoyed for many years. (Alberts, 45) These developments have given rise to a more 
robust global economy.  The thaw of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union in 
1991 have drastically affected the world scene in terms of security.  The bipolar power 
struggle of the Cold War has given way to managing global interdependencies between 
nations.  These complexities involved at the geopolitical level create land attack scenarios 
where technical and doctrinal interoperability with allied forces are important.   
(2) The Operating Environment.  Post Cold War 
conflict has placed the Navy in the littoral regions of the world.  From the Adriatic Sea to 
the Persian Gulf, the Navy's focus from blue water surface- to -surface and surface-to-air 
engagements against the Soviet Navy has migrated to the capability to strike land-based 
targets from the sea.  These changes in physical operating environments and missions 
have brought new challenges.  Strike missions are conducted from the decks of aircraft 
carriers and from ship-launched cruise missiles.  These missions require higher levels of 
coordination between ground and air units in order to deconflict airspace and accurately 
engage targets.  With sea-based units operating in proximity to the land-sea interface, the 
threat of shore launched anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missile batteries is 
increased.  Complexity in this area of the environment requires that decisions be made 
rapidly and with respect to changing operational and tactical environments.   
(3) The User Environment.  The user environment is 
changing as well.  The use of information technology is affecting the way individual 
sailors and marines conduct their tasks.  Experiments such as Smart Ship and Urban 
Warrior have introduced information technologies at the unit level to demonstrate how 
the availability of information affects how missions are conducted.  In the case of the 
Smart Ship, crew size was reduced and processes reengineered to reflect the use of 
technology.  Successes with Smart Ship have paved the way for new ship construction 
plans with crew sizes reduced to one-third that of today's ships.   
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The degree and persistence of these complexities point to the need to 
examine the organizational structures and doctrine that support land attack. 
b. Organizational Mismatch and Strategies for Change 
"…[T]he most important thing leaders can help their organizations to do, 
because the conditions under which businesses and governments are functioning today 
are more turbulent, more chaotic, [and] more challenging than ever…." is to master 
change. (Kanter, 71)  Effective command and control has two characteristics: unity of 
command and simplicity in execution.  Unity of command requires organizational 
cohesiveness, and simplicity in execution requires clear and uncomplicated plans.  
Achieving these two characteristics is to master the changing environments in which 
decision makers operate.  
Many themes from the corporate and academic communities exist that can 
help achieve organizational cohesiveness and simplicity in execution.  Figure (1-3), a 
new convention by Jansen (2001) based upon Mintzberg (1993), depicts a shift in 
organizational structure in the 21st-century military as a result of increasingly complex 
environments.  The graph shows how environmental uncertainty is affected by the 
amount of change in the environment, its hostility, and equivocality.  Increases or 
decreases in environmental uncertainty affect the way an organization coordinates its 
efforts.  These coordination efforts differ with the type of the organizational structure in 
























































Adhocracy     
(Mutual Adjustment)
Shift in Organizational Configuration for Modal DoD Organizations as 





































Figure (1-3) - Shift in Organizational Configuration for Modal Organizations as they 
Move Through the RMA (From Jansen 2001, based upon Mintzberg 1993) 
 
A 21st-century military force is classified as an organic organization, one 
characterized by low levels of organizational complexity and control mechanisms.  
Lower levels of organizational complexity and control mechanisms concentrate decision-
making abilities, through constraints, at the appropriate level in the organization.  These 
themes are further developed in the application of complex adaptive systems theory to 
organizational management.  
Complex adaptive systems are characterized by an inherent self-
organizing capability based upon the continual changes in the environment. Robert 
Maxfield, in his article “Complexity and Organizational Management”, suggests that 
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organizations are more successful when there are fewer operating principles and 
guidelines.  Organizational structures serve as guidelines for interactions and 
relationships.  Keeping pace with the ever-changing environment requires widely 
delegated decision-making authority coupled with short authority chains (Eisenhardt, 40). 
Kathy Eisenhardt and Shona Brown, in Competing on the Edge of Chaos, 
build on Maxfield's conclusions.  For an organization to keep pace with rapidly changing 
environments, it must be able to improvise effectively.  Effective improvisation is 
characterized by small amounts of "…structure coupled with intense, real-time 
communication." (Eisenhardt, 45).  She goes on to say, "these simple structures and 
extensive communication allow people to engage in much more complicated and 
adaptive behaviors…." (Eisenhardt, 45).  Improvisational organizations have three 
common traits:  
• Adaptive Culture: Managers expect change.  They anticipate the need to 
iterate, backtrack, and adjust their actions. 
• Semi-Structures:  There are few formal structures.  Processes rely on key 
structural points that are never violated.  These structure points may be 
deadlines or priorities. 
• Real-Time Communications: Communications are rampant throughout the 
organization, but, not without respect to boundaries or the task at hand. 
Communication is targeted on the task and focused in real-time. 
(Eisenhardt, 47) 
Rosabeth Moss Kanter, in her article “Mastering Change,” from the book 
Learning Organizations, edited by Sarita Chawla, also poses similar organizational traits.  
Kanter proposes four characteristics that provide sufficient leverage in coping with 
environmental complexity.  Focused, fast, flexible, and friendly apply to organizational 
structure and guiding principles.  Focused and fast describe organizational structure and 
communication.  Focused organizations place decision-making capability in the proper 
places in the organization to facilitate speed.  Fast organizations use streamlined semi-
structures as guidelines for execution as a source of speed and adaptability.  Flexible and 
friendly describe the adaptive culture in the organization.  An adaptive culture uses 
flexibility in organizational structure to capitalize on changing environments.  Flexibility 
and friendliness in organizational structure provide cohesiveness and simplicity in 
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execution through using an adaptive culture to create structure and communication in 
response to changing environments. 
c. Doctrinal Mismatch - From Platform Centric to Network Centric  
A command-and-control approach requires a structure responsible for 
disseminating the commander's intent and resources.   This structure serves as doctrine, 
or rules governing the way the business of warfare are conducted.  A different approach, 
which mitigates the complexities of the land attack environment, modifies how warfare 
resources are organized. In a platform centric method of viewing resources, a platform 
has sensors and weapons.  A decision-maker controls and consumes the limited platform 
resources in conducting processes in accordance with the commander's intent.  In a 
network centric method of viewing resources, the network has resources capable of 
interacting to produce desired results.  Decision makers control their use with 
commander's intent, but they have more flexibility in using resources to conduct 
processes.  In the network centric system, each node logically connects to other nodes 
within the system.  "The source of the increased power in a network-centric operation is 
derived in part from the content, quality, and timeliness of information flowing between 
the nodes in the network." (Alberts, 45  ) 
(1) Network Centric Land Attack.  A generic land 
attack scenario provides some insight into the power of network centric warfare.  The 
force assigned to conduct this land attack mission contains six amphibious ships, sixteen 
surface combatants, and a landing force comprising two regiments of marines 
(approximately 1500 personnel), fifteen assault vehicles, and twenty-five aircraft.  Each 
portion of this force has organic sensors, weapons, and decision makers.  As this large 
maneuvering force transitions ashore, surface forces must have a distributed means of 
sensing, deciding, and acting in order to keep pace with the complexity.  
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In a networked environment, sensors, decision makers, and 
weapons are linked together logically.  Physical connections exist on the platform.  
Target information enters the network through the sensors in the form of raw data.  The 
decision makers based upon the command and control inputs being received collectively 
evaluate the target data.  Changes in the situation are rapidly disseminated among 
decision makers, and engagements are conducted using linked weapons.  The linkage 
adds flexibility in terms of engagements, sensing, and decision-making.  Figure (1-4) 
































A fully integrated land attack capability that can project combat power in support 
of national and military objectives is the goal of the land attack mission area.  Land attack 
will be conducted in a rapidly changing environment, in support of maneuvering forces 
ashore or against time-critical strategic, operational, or tactical targets.  This requires an 
evolution of fragmented sensors, weapons, intelligence, and command-and-control assets 
into a seamless architecture that allows a properly sized force to execute land attack 
missions at all levels of conflict. 
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Technical, organizational, and doctrinal problems exist that must be overcome to 
achieve this goal.  While technology plays a major role in the evolution of the integrated 
land attack capability, it is only part of the solution.  Organizational and doctrinal issues 
must be understood in terms of the complexities of the operating environments and must 
evolve with the technological solutions.   
"Processes show the activities required to achieve explicit goals along with their 
relationships with the resources participating in the process." (Eriksson and Penker 105) 
In the next chapter, the structure of the land attack resources is examined.  Key business 
information and the structure of the organization are modeled to provide a complete 
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III. BUSINESS STRUCTURE VIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Eriksson-Penker business extension tools model the business architecture 
using four views: The Business Vision, the Business Structure, the Business Process, and 
the Business Behavior.  In the last chapter, the business vision was presented in terms of 
the land attack goals and associated problems.  Processes consume and transform 
resources to achieve business goals.  The business structure view focuses on how these 
resources are organized. 
The Eriksson-Penker Business Structure view contains three models: a resource 
model, an information model, and an organization model.  The Business Structure view 
uses UML class diagrams to depict the resources needed to conduct the core business 
processes.  "…[T]raditional organizational charts and descriptions of the products and 
services …the company provides, are the basis for the Business Structure view." 
(Eriksson and Penker, 118)  
The resource model depicts the inner structure of the resources, which form the 
land attack products and services.  The resource model is structured in a manner that 
divides land attack resources into classes: sensors, decision makers, and weapons.  The 
Business Structure view also models the information used during land attack 
engagements.  This resource is modeled using the following classes: planning, targeting, 
coordinating, deconflicting, executing, and assessing.  The organization is modeled last.  
"The basic functions of an organizational model are to show the allocation of resources, 
the reporting methods, task assignments, and the way the [organization] is managed." 
(Eriksson and Penker, 122).  The land attack organizational structure is modeled using 
the following classes: strategic, operational, and tactical.  These models are found in 
Appendix B. 
1. Land Attack Missions and Roles 
Land attack warfare consists of two missions, Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) 
and Naval Surface Strike (NSS).  The NSS mission involves attacking strategic and or 
operational targets with precision guided munitions, such as the Tomahawk Land Attack 
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Missile (TLAM).  The NSFS mission encompasses the use of naval gunfire in support of 
a ground combat force.   
Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) provides fires to support maneuvering forces 
from naval guns, missiles, and electronic warfare systems.  In a supporting unit role, one 
or more NSFS units receive orders to fire individually at targets from a fire-support 
coordination agency or directly from a forward observer.  In the controlling unit role, a 
NSFS unit directs and controls fires for multiple surface combatants.  A controlling unit 
receives requests for fire from fire-support coordination agencies, processes them in 
accordance with the commander's intent and rules of engagement, and assigns one or 
more ships under its control to provide the support. 
Naval Surface Strike (NSS) is the destruction or neutralization of enemy targets 
through the use of conventional weapons provided by surface combatants.  Ships engage 
targets at all levels of conflict.  Engagements are conducted independently of ground 
maneuver forces.  In a single ship role, a NSS unit is responsible for planning, targeting, 
deconflicting, coordinating, executing, and assessing its own strike missions in 
accordance with commander's intent.  A unit has the authority to determine which targets 
to engage, with what weapons, and to what degree to engage them.  In the Multi-Ship 
role, a NSS unit must be able to conduct those duties explained above, as well as control 
and assign strike missions to other surface units operating in concert. 
B. LAND ATTACK BUSINESS STRUCTURE VIEWS 
1. Land Attack Resource Model 
The resource models are organized such that land attack resources are categorized 
in one of three classes:  sensors, weapons, and decision makers.  They are graphically 
represented in Appendix B.  The classes translate into a network centric arrangement.  
The following land attack scenario, as developed by the CONOPS WIPT, provides a 
background for analyzing the resources: 
In 2015, the Straits of Hormuz have been closed.  The United States 
chooses to respond to the situation unilaterally, through the use of an 
amphibious task force and its supporting units.  To reopen the Straits of 
Hormuz, the US conducts an amphibious assault on the coast adjacent to 
the eastern side of the straits in order to clear out enemy coastal defenses 
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and threats to shipping.  An amphibious task force has been assigned to 
conduct the mission.  Sixteen surface combatants, organized in four 
surface action groups comprised of four ships each will support it.  The 
assault will be of Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) size.  It will be 
comprised of a regimental sized vertical assault in one area, and a 
regimental sized surface assault in another. The surface units are assigned 
fire support roles to support the assault. 
a. Decision Makers 
Three levels categorize decision makers: strategic, operational, and 
tactical.  Decision-maker resources are classified in the same manner.  Engaging targets 
can be time critical events.  A timely response requires that decisions be made at 
appropriate levels of conflict.  Decision-maker responsibilities vary with type of decision-
maker.  The decision-maker resources are focused on what is appropriately decided at 
each level.  
Decision makers in the strategic class set commander's intent and generate 
rules of engagement.  They are responsible for specifying the forces' mission, 
establishing target packages, and providing them to operational commanders in the form 
of simple, clear, and concise directives.  The unified commander utilizes the Joint Force 
Commander and his/her staff to promulgate these directives.  The Joint Force 
Commander has four specialized decision makers in the form of component commanders.  
They aid the Joint Force Commander with specific decisions regarding the employment 
of land, air, sea, and special operations forces.  Intent and rules of engagement are issued 
to operational commanders, from these specialized decision makers, to use as guiding 
principles when planning the campaign. 
Decision makers in the operational class use the mission, commander's 
intent, and rules of engagement and apply them to available resources.  From the Straits 
of Hormuz scenario, a regimental-sized vertical and surface assault is conducted to 
forcibly reopen the sea passage.  Three types of decision makers exist at the operational 
level: the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF), Commander Landing Force 
(CLF), and the Tomahawk Strike Coordinator (TSC).  Rules and relationships exist 
between CATF and CLF about the types of decisions made during the amphibious assault 
timelines.  Decisions are made about what time the amphibious assault will take place, 
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the size, specialization, and order of the assault.  The TSC deconflicts TLAM 
(Tomahawk Land Attack Missile) campaigns with the Joint Force Air Component 
Commander (JFACC) and provides advanced deconfliction of TLAM launch sequence 
plans among firing units.  These decisions are made within the confines of the 
commander's intent and the clear, concise, and simple plans from the strategic decision 
making level.  The operational commander issues orders to tactical units with more 
specific commander's intent and ROE. 
Decision makers in the tactical class make decisions with specific time 
requirements.  Ground force fire support requirements for supported units are gathered, 
prioritized, and assigned firing units.  Decisions, such as which firing unit is in the best 
position to successfully complete the engagement, are made at the tactical level.  
Commanders of firing units, at sea and ashore, decide how to best configure sensors and 
batteries to deconflict local areas of fire and ensure proper rates of fire to achieve mission 
success.  Commanders have teams of decision makers in their operations centers 
evaluating tactical data and making recommendations for action.  Tactical decision 
makers observe their surroundings, orient themselves to their current situations, decide on 
proper courses of action, and execute the plans.  Tactical decision makers operate rapidly 
using clear commander's intent to coordinate fires, coordinate friendly and neutral force 
movements, and engage the hostile forces,  
b. Sensors and Weapons 
An integrated land attack capability rests upon the ability to conduct 
precision engagements, properly scaled in terms of rate and type of fire.  To conduct 
NSFS and NSS missions, the commander must have sensors available to search, detect, 
track, and classify targets of interest.  Sensors available to decision makers range from 
shipboard radar to national space based reconnaissance assets.  A sensor may be 
classified as one of three resources: surveillance, detection and tracking, or 
reconnaissance.    
Decision makers must have the ability to use and provide data and 
information to these sensors.  For example, when an at-sea unit is conducting NSS 
missions against time critical targets, decision makers have imagery of these targets from 
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national space assets used in mission planning.  The firing unit needs to augment this 
imagery with updated information prior to engaging it.  The firing unit launches two 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and passes their control to special operations forces 
ashore.  The UAVs send current target information including target type, size, direction 
of movement, and friendly forces in the area.  The firing unit updates the target 
information in the target folder.  It engages the target in accordance with commander's 
intent and rules of engagement with four rounds of Extended Range Guided Munitions 
(ERGMs) from its Advanced Gun Mount.  With rounds complete, the special operations 
forces use the UAVs to conduct battle damage assessment (BDA).  The special 
operations forces report primary and secondary explosions in the vicinity of the attack 
and confirm the target destroyed.  The firing unit updates the target information with the 
imagery of the destroyed target and stands by to conduct further engagements. 
(1) Weapons.  In the Straits of Hormuz scenario, 
decision makers have numerous weapons available for use to ensure precision and 
scalability.  Land Attack weapons fall into one of three categories: fires, maneuvering 
forces, and electronic warfare.  Electronic warfare weapons are another method of 
destroying enemy targets asymmetrically.  The classification of this work precludes their 
discussion.   
Weapons are classified as fires and maneuvering forces.  
These are the primary weapon resources used by decision makers conducting land attack 
warfare. Freeing the Straits of Hormuz requires a combined regimental, vertical, and 
surface assault.  The Marine Air, Ground, Task Force (MAGTF) conducts the assault 
from amphibious shipping from over the horizon.  The maneuvering forces, Landing 
Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) and Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAAV), carry 
Marines and their equipment ashore.  Rotary wing aircraft, supported by fixed wing 
marine fighters, aide in transferring the Marines ashore.  Ships and aircraft, in support of 
the maneuvering forces, provide fires as they proceed inland.  Fires exist in many forms, 
from precision-guided munitions to gravity bombs, rockets, and mortars.  Using their 
situational awareness of the battlespace, decision makers select the proper fires based 
upon type of target, proximity to friendly and neutral forces, and lethality.  Additionally, 
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decision makers must have visibility of all weapons resources in order to select those best 
suited for the missions at hand to ensure precision, lethality, and scalability.   
2. Land Attack Information Model 
The Eriksson-Penker UML Business Extensions Tool Kit "…creates models of 
strategically important information in the business." (Eriksson and Penker, 119).  This 
information model depicts information in a class-object model (Shown in Appendix B.).  
Information can control actions taken by decision makers, as well as be controlled by 
decision makers during the execution of the engagement process.  Knowing the types of 
information within the business model aids decision makers in designing information 
systems that leverage it in the most effective manner. 
The land attack information model was compiled using the following 
considerations.  A time-critical strike requires a great deal of information sharing.  The 
Network Centric Operations: Time Critical Strike CONOPS lists the information-sharing 
requirements: 
• The capacity to share information about targets and surrounding threats 
must be present in a format that will facilitate rapid decision-making. 
• Updated surveillance and reconnaissance information and a common 
operating picture should be shared between echelons. 
• Command and Control procedures and systems must be in place that allow 
for the execution of time-critical strike at the lowest feasible level, while 
providing simultaneous synchronization and deconfliction with other 
friendly forces. 
The land attack missions and roles were examined to determine the most 
demanding information environments.  In both missions, surface units must act in single 
and multiple ship roles.  In NSS missions, a single surface combatant is required to plan, 
target, coordinate, deconflict, control, execute, and assess its fires.  In NSFS mission, in a 
coordinating unit role, a unit receives requests for fire from fire-support coordination 
agencies.  It processes the requests, in accordance with commander's intent and rules of 
engagement, and assigns one or more ships under its control to provide the requested 
fires. 
Strategic and operational decision makers require data and information regarding 
the tactical situation so as to best prepare for future events, allocate resources, or issue 
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updates and revisions to commander's intent and rules of engagement.  Land attack 
information requirements are broken down into planning, targeting, deconflicting, 
coordinating, controlling, executing, and assessing categories.  Each decision-maker uses 
information in these categories differently.  
3. Land Attack Organization Model 
The organizational structure model furthers the notion of strategic, operational, 
and tactical levels of conflict to model the land attack organization.  It concentrates on 
organization as the means to distribute resources and decision-making authority in terms 
of commander's intent and rules of engagement.  The organizational model is graphically 
depicted in Appendix B. 
The operation to reclaim the Straits of Hormuz begins with the National 
Command Authority.  The President of the United States, with the aide of the National 
Security Council and through the Secretary of Defense, exercises "…statutory authority, 
direction, and control over the [armed forces] and is responsible for the effective, 
efficient, and economical operation."  (Overview of the National Security Structure, 1)  
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) serves as a statutory advisor to the 
President as part of the National Security Council and is an intermediary between the 
unified commanders and the National Command Authority (NCA). The Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1986 defines the command authority for all combatant commanders.  
Unified combatant commanders have the authority to prescribe chains of command 
within their commands, organize commands and forces to carry out missions, and employ 
forces necessary to carry them out.  
In the event of a conflict, such as the operation to free the Straits of Hormuz, 
USCENTCOM (United States Central Command) may elect to serve as the Joint Force 
Commander.  The Joint Force Commander has subordinate staffs to integrate the various 
services.  The Joint Force Commander's staff is organized into various component 
commanders: air component, land forces component, maritime component, and special 
operations component.  Through the use of operational control (OPCON), the Joint Force 
Commander delegates to these component commanders the authority to organize the 
composition of subordinate forces, assign tasks, and designate objectives.  These 
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component commanders have the authority necessary to accomplish the mission.  
Separate forces operating within the unified commander's geographic area fall under the 
responsibility of the component commander.  These operating forces are given OPCON 
by the component commander's to conduct particular aspects of the joint mission.  
In the Straits of Hormuz scenario, the Naval Component Commander (NCC), 
Commander Task Force 50 (CTF 50), is given OPCON by the JFMCC, Commander Fifth 
Fleet (COMFIFTHFLEET), conducts the maritime portions of the mission. 
COMFIFTHFLEET grants OPCON to CTF 50, a commander amphibious task force 
(CATF), and a Commander Landing Force (CLF) to conduct the amphibious assault.   
The CTF 50, CATF, and CLF have resources at their disposal and utilize tactical control 
(TACON) in the execution of their operations.  TACON is the "detailed and, usually, 
local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions 
or tasks assigned." (Overview of the National Security Structure, 5).  
The CTF 50, as a battle group (BG) commander has OPCON and TACON of 
assigned resources as well.  Within the BG there exist various resources and command 
relationships.  The Composite Warfare Commander's (CWC) structure organizes battle 
group forces.  The CWC is responsible for assigning warfare area commanders and 
resource coordinators.  A battle group has one commander for each warfare group: air, 
surface, undersea, and strike.  Resource coordinators allot the use of common fleet 
resources such as fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.  The CWC controls the operational 
environment by negation and modifying commander's intent and rules of engagement as 
the tactical situation changes.  The BG commander may dispatch resources to CATF in 
conducting amphibious operations.  For example, CATF can take OPCON of surface 
action groups (SAG) of two or more ships to conduct Naval Surface Fire Support or 
Naval Surface Strike Missions.  Within the SAG individual Land Attack (LA) units, 
teams of personnel are conducting LA operations from their Combat Information Centers.  
The BG commander may additionally assign a Tomahawk Strike Coordinator (TSC).  
The TSC assigns Launch Area Coordinators (LAC) to specific launch points and to 
coordinate and to deconflict NSS Missions. 
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C. SUMMARY 
The Business Structure view serves as a method to analyze the resources used in 
the business process.  The business process transforms resources to achieve business 
goals.  In the Land Attack process, sensor, weapon, and decision-maker resources are 
used to conduct NSFS and NSS missions.  This chapter has provided an analysis of the 
available resources structured in a manner that supports dynamically allocated firepower 
provided to commanders at the appropriate level of conflict with the decision-making 
ability to conduct them.  In the next chapter, the land attack business processes are 
modeled using the Eriksson-Penker UML Business Extension Tool Kit.  These views 
show the available resources and depict how they are transformed to achieve the business 
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IV. BUSINESS PROCESS VIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters proposed a resource structure that organized warfighting 
capability around sensor, weapon, and decision-maker resources.  The next step is to 
examine the business of land attack in terms of events and processes.  "A business 
process is a collection of activities that takes one or more kinds of inputs and creates an 
output that is of value to the customer." (Eriksson and Penker, 68)  Using the Eriksson-
Penker Business Extensions Tool Kit for the Unified Modeling Language (UML), the 
core land attack processes are examined in terms of those resource types and in relation 
to a set of business events.   
Constructing the business process model begins with an introduction of the core 
land attack business process: the engagement.  The "Call for Fire" is presented as its key 
business event.  It "Call for Fire" is described in terms of decision points and rules sets 
that it imposes on the engagement processes.  The engagement process is depicted in 
process diagrams, which include the resources involved in terms of input and output 
objects and those objects acting as supplies and controls in the process.  Detailed 
descriptions of the processes and the event cycle are located in Appendix C. 
B. ERIKSSON-PENKER BUSINESS PROCESS VIEW  
As previously stated, a business may be viewed in terms of its goals, resources, 
and organizational structure.   The goals, resources, and organizational structure exist in 
order to accomplish work.  The work of the business is understood in the business 
process.  "The [business] processes show the activities that must be undertaken to achieve 
an explicit goal, along with their relationships with the resources participating in the 


























Figure (3-1) - Generic Process Activity Diagram (From Eriksson and Penker 2000) 
 
The business process view is described using a UML activity diagram.  The 
activity diagram is modified by the Eriksson-Penker Business Extensions to depict a set 
of stereotypes that define a process and its various resources. (Eriksson and Penker, 105)  
The process diagram (Figure 3-1) depicts the interaction between resources participating 
in the process.  The process diagram shows five different types of objects.  They are 
listed below with a brief discussion of each. 
• Goal Objects: One or more goal objects are associated with each business 
process.  The goal object will be achieved upon completion of the process. 
• Input Objects: Objects that are either consumed or refined in the process.  
The input objects are resources compiled from the Business Structure view 
• Output Objects: Objects that are produced by the process or exist as a 
result of the refinement of the input objects.  The output objects are 
resources compiled from the Business Structure view. 
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• Supplying Objects: Objects that participate in the process but are not 
consumed or refined.  The supplying objects are resources compiled from 
the Business Structure view. 
• Controlling Objects: Objects that affect the execution of the process.  
The controlling objects are resources compiled from the Business 
Structure view. 
A process may be broken down into sub-processes, and sub-processes into 
activities. For example, the process associated with changing a flat tire includes the sub-
process of reading an owner's manual for instructions and the activity of opening the 
book and checking the table of contents for the proper page.  Any process may be 
decomposed into large amounts of sub-processes and activities.  A process is considered 
atomic when a sufficient level of detail has been reached for the process being examined.  
Continuing with the owner's manual example, the sub-process may be declared atomic at 
the "read the owner's manual" level. 
The Eriksson-Penker business notation represents business events as classes and 
objects in a generalization hierarchy to depict their relationships.  A business event may 
be classified as either sending or receiving.  A sending business event is generated by a 
process and initiates another portion of the same process or a completely new process.  A 
process waits for a "receive" business event before it begins the next activity.  A receive 
business event may also be used to trigger a set of alternative processes, thus acting as a 
decision point.   
C. IDENTIFICATION OF LAND ATTACK CORE PROCESSES AND 
BUSINESS EVENTS 
1. Development of the Engagement Process 
The land attack business process model consists of two parts: the Land Attack 
Core Processes and the Land Attack Business Events. Identifying the key concepts 
associated with land attack business processes was accomplished by reviewing the 
Surface Combatant Land Attack Concept of Operations: Roles, Missions, and 
Employment Considerations and the Network Centric Operations, Time Critical Strike 
Concept of Operations.   
The land attack core process is the "engagement."  The "engagement" consists of 
four sub-processes: detect, decide, engage, and assess.  The key land attack business 
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event is the "Call for Fire."  The "Call for Fire" business event consists of four decision 
points (explained in Appendix C) that answer the "Call for Fire" and impose associated 
rule sets on the "engagement" process.  The baseline business process models and event 
structures were generated from descriptions of Naval Surface Fire Support and Naval 
Surface Strike listed in the previous chapters. 
The principles of time-critical strike provide the basis for the land attack 
"engagement" process.  The time-critical strike decision cycle provides a process for 
decision makers that may be used to engage time-critical targets.  The decision cycle 
consists of four steps: detect, decide, engage, assess.  They are explained in more detail 
below: (TCS CONOPS, 15-30) 
• Detect:  The process in which targets are investigated, validated, and 
nominated for engagement.   The intent of the detection process is to 
rapidly identify the target as one that warrants response and then pass that 
information on in the decision process.  The detect process includes six 
steps:  cue, assess, task, collect, exploit, and nominate. 
• Decide:  In order to handle the number of potential targets that may be 
detected during any phase of joint operations, distributed decision making  
must be used to prioritize targets, select weapons, and ensure adequate 
synchronization and deconfliction occur.  An engagement decision is the 
result of the "decide" process.  The decide process consists of seven steps:  
prioritize, weapon-target-platform match, decide, coordinate and 
deconflict, update mission planning, weaponeering, and tasking. 
• Engage:  With the engagement decision made, the next step is to task the 
execution of the decision and plan for the assessment of the engagement.  
Execution can be conducted in three ways, depending on the type of target 
being engaged and the strategic, operational, or tactical situation involved.  
The three types of execution are: decentralized execution, update mission 
execution, and new mission execution.  Assessment planning is expected 
to ensure that adequate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) resources are available to decision makers prior to execution in 
order to quickly and accurately assess the execution of the engagement 
decision. 
• Assess:  The assessment phase differs from the detection phase in time 
only, in that it occurs after the engagement has been executed.  The 
assessment phase consists of the same five steps as the detection phase 
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2. Land Attack Core Processes and Business Events 
The land attack core processes are viewed in terms of their relationship with the 
land attack business events.  "A business event represents a record of a change in the 
business at a particular instance in time." (Eriksson and Penker, 74)  The business 
processes are initiated, affected, or terminated by an instance of a business event. 
a. Land Attack Business Events 
The key business event associated with the land attack core processes is 
the "Call for Fire".  A "Call for Fire" serves as the external event requiring certain actions 
(Eriksson and Penker, 74).  The "Call for Fire" requires instances of sensor, decision 
maker, weapon, and information resources to produce the engagement.  The business 
event cycle serves two purposes.  First, it initiates a decision matrix.  Second, it invokes 
business rules associated with the event, dictating how resources are used in the ensuing 
engagement process. 
The "Call for Fire" business event cycle is negotiated through a series of 
decision points that describe how the "engagement" process unfolds.  Once executed, 
decision points initiate sub-events and associated rule sets.  The rule sets specify how the 
"engagement" process is executed.  Figures 3.2 and 3.3 represent the cycle.  The concave 
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Figure (3-3) - "Call for Fire Event Cycle (Part 2) 
 
The "Call for Fire" involves three decision points (Figure. 3-2).  The first 
decision point differentiates the type of engagement.  If the "Call for Fire" is in support of 
maneuvering forces, it is answered using the NSFS event and rule set.  If the "Call for 
Fire" is independent of a maneuvering force, it is answered using the NSS event and rule 
set.  
A "Call for Fire" answered using NSFS rules generates a controlling unit 
or a supporting unit event and associated rule sets.  A description of the controlling unit 
and supporting unit concepts describes the rules.  A controlling unit directs and controls 
the fires of multiple surface combatants.  A controlling unit receives requests for fire 
support from fire support coordination agencies, processes the requests in accordance 
with commander's guidance, and assigns one or more ships under its control to provide 
the requested fires.  A supporting unit provides fires in support of maneuvering forces 
ashore.  One or more ships individually receive orders to fire from a fire support 
coordination agency of the supported unit or directly from a forward observer. 
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A "Call for Fire", using NSS rules, generates a single ship or a multi-ship 
event and associated rule sets.  A single ship must be capable of planning, targeting, 
controlling, coordinating, deconflicting, executing, and assessing own-ship fires.  A 
single unit receives mission orders, commander's guidance, and rules of engagement from 
higher authority, and with no higher-level on-scene commander or fires coordination 
element in the area of operation must execute the mission.  As the coordinator of a 
multiple ship group, the single ship must be able to conduct strike missions as a single 
unit as well as control units in the execution of strike missions. 
The final set of decision points exists when a unit is conducting NSFS 
(Figure 3-3).  As a Supporting or Controlling Unit, it may be assigned additional roles, 
which determine the type of service the unit provides.  In the Direct Support (DS) role, a 
unit provides close supporting fire to a specific unit.  A platform operating in the General 
Support (GS) role provides support to the force as a whole.  In the Reinforcing role (R), a 
fire support unit reinforces the fires of another unit who is in a DS role.  A platform 
operating in a General Support-Reinforcing role (GS-R) provides general support fires to 
the force as a whole and reinforces the fires of the assigned direct support unit.   
The decision points and rule sets are described in more detail in Appendix 
C. 
b. Land Attack Core Business Process 
The core land attack business process is the "engagement."  The 
engagement process consists of four sub-processes, each with associated activities. The 
four sub-processes are: detect, decide, engage, and assess.   The "engagement" process is 







Figure (3-4) - Engagement Process Diagram with Sub-Processes 
Developing the "engagement" process and its parts requires the 
introduction of a new resource named "target. " The target resource serves as the input to 
the engagement process.  The engagement process uses sensors and weapon resources 
controlled by decision-maker resources.  They transform the target from an undetected 
physical object (the input to the engagement) to an evaluated physical object that has 





















Figure (3-5) - Engagement Activity Diagram with Resources 
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Basic categories such as friendly, neutral, and enemy involve a value-
adding process.  A target is any physical entity with potential military, economic, or 
political importance to the commander.  Targets may constitute key capabilities or 
centers of gravity and exist at all levels of conflict.  For example, a potential target is an 
intelligence processing facility or tanks in the line of advancing infantry.  Targets have no 
inherent strategic, operational, or tactical value until decision makers evaluate them.   
For example, land attack decision makers value the location of country 
Red's intelligence processing stations.  Satellite imagery of a group of buildings in an 
urban area is received and evaluated by intelligence analysts.  The buildings in the photos 
are identified using reliable local sources as intelligence processing facilities.  This 
determination adds operational value to the buildings.  Another level of investigation 
might conclude the buildings housing the processing facilities belong to a neutral country 
involved in the conflict.  The buildings are not targeted but maintain their operational 
value.   
The engagement process provides an avenue to add value to potential 
targets.  The following paragraphs describe the components of the engagement process.  
Appendix C contains descriptions, in terms of resources, and the UML activity diagrams. 
(1) Detect.  "Detection involves collecting, correlating, 
and assessing information from all sources; from observers on scene, to highly sensitive 
real-time intelligence data, to information archived in special intelligence databases." 
(TCS CONOPS, 15)  The detection cycle is a balance between decision-maker 
requirements and available sensor resources.  The process relies on the decision-maker's 
ability to keep abreast of the operational situation and make priorities known to others 
involved in the detection cycle.  Its associated activities provide a means for decision 
makers to state detection requirements and make detection resources available.  These 
activities begin with decision makers setting their detection priorities.  Targets are 
detected by various sensor sources, and the data is correlated and fused.  Cueing priorities 
are reevaluated and disseminated.  The activities are complete when decision makers 
confirm targets and target information is shared with an added recommendation for 
mission tasking. 
36 
(2) Decide.  The decision process is where "…all 
elements [of the engagement process] must work together to recommend the relative 
priority of the mission, the appropriate weapons systems option used to engage the target, 
what to target and how, and what coordination is needed to ensure adequate 
synchronization and deconfliction."  (TCS CONOPS, 19)  While the decide process 
follows the detection process in the logical engagement process, many activities 
conducted during this phase occur concurrently with the detection phase.  Decision 
makers can prioritize targets and match desired mission effects with weapon types.   They 
may also establish preplanned responses dictating which types of targets in particular 
areas will be engaged with which types of weapons.  Conducting this type of planning 
concurrently affords decision makers the opportunity to move immediately to 
coordination and deconfliction, weaponeering, and mission tasking, as targets are 
detected.  
(3) Engage.  The engage component consists of two 
sub-processes: execution and planning for combat assessment.  Execution is the 
fulfillment of the tasking developed in the Decide phase.  Assessment planning ensures 
adequate sensor resources in advance of the engagement for battle damage assessment.  
Execution of this process occurs in one of three ways, 
depending on the capabilities of the firing unit.  These capabilities are the availability of 
sensor, decision-maker, and weapon resources.  The three types of execution are 
decentralization, update mission, or new mission.  Decentralized execution occurs when 
the firing unit has a sufficient amount of sensor, decision-maker, and weapon assets 
available, as in NSS/Single-Ship.  This availability provides the firing unit with the 
responsibility to complete its own mission updates, target verification, coordination, 
synchronization, deconfliction, and execution (TCS CONOPS, 25).  The update mission 
method of execution might occur when other decision-maker and sensor resources have 
completed the majority of mission planning.  Updated mission information and targeting 
instructions are passed to the firing unit conducting the engagement, as in 
NSFS/Controlling Unit.  In the another method of execution, the desired firing unit has 
insufficient resources to engage the target.  Sensor and decision-maker resources generate 
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a new engagement.  By creating a new engagement, more resources are generated.  
Decentralization and update mission events lead to the execution and plan for assessment 
sub-processes, while the new mission event enters the detect-decide portion of the 
process at any point depending on the target information presented. 
(4) Assess.  Portions of the assessment process occur 
throughout the engagement.  "All [the] assessments have one thing in common, they must 
determine from the information at hand whether there is enough to support a decision to 
engage or whether more information needs to be collected and evaluated." (TCS 
CONOPS, 27)  The assessment process is the means used in determining if the 
engagement was successful, partially successful, or a failure.  The value placed on the 
target by decision-maker resources in the assessment phase will determine to what degree 
the target reenters the engagement process.  If the target is fully destroyed, it might be 
updated in the target database.  A partially destroyed target might be updated and enter 
the engagement process again in the decide sub-process.  A missed target might enter the 
process in the engage portion and be executed again immediately.  The sub-processes and 
activities mirror those in the detect process.   
D. SUMMARY 
The Business Process view has described the interactions between different 
resource types in the execution of the "engagement" process.  Goals and problems 
associated with land attack have been introduced and explained.  A resource structure 
was introduced organizing them into sensors, weapons, and decision makers.  This 
chapter has depicted how these resources supply and control the process to achieve goals. 
The "Call for Fire" was introduced as the key business event associated with land 
attack, leading to the engagement process.  Decision points were used to determine how 
best to answer the "Call for Fire", with a Surface Strike mission or a Fire Support 
mission.  Decision points were also used in determining which roles within the two 
missions would be applied in answering the “Call for Fire”.  Baseline decision criteria 
and rule sets were established for each, thus creating a relationship between the business 
event and operating rules associated with each role.    
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A baseline business process view was introduced to show this relationship.  The 
target resource was introduced as the value-added resource in the engagement process.  
The physical attributes of the entity remain the same; but the entity changes value, as 
decision-maker, sensor, and weapon resources are applied.  Targets and decision-maker 
resources enter the engagement process.  Sensor and weapon resources are supplied, as 
controlled by additional decision-maker resources, to achieve the land attack goals. 
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V. BUSINESS BEHAVIOR VIEW  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The "engagement" process and the "Call for Fire" have been introduced in the 
Business Process view.  The Business Behavior View shows how the "engagement" 
process interacts with its resources, how it interacts with the "Call for Fire" event cycle, 
and how the elements of the "engagement" process interact as a system.  The 
"engagement" process and "Call for Fire" event cycle create valid targets and successful 
engagements.  The behaviors are described below. 
• Process-Resource Behavior: Processes and resources interact as they 
progress through their sub-processes and activities.  A process needs 
instances of control and supply resources to transform an input resource.  
Process-Resource Behavior captures this behavior with Assembly-Line 
modeling. 
• Process-Event Behavior: Processes interact with business events.  The 
business event triggers the beginning of a process or signifies its end. 
Process-Event behavior demonstrates how these interactions affect the 
outcome of the process, in terms of how the event cycle affects the release 
of resources. 
• System-Wide Behavior: Processes and events form a system.  Input is 
introduced to the system and through the interaction between the 
processes, resources, and events an output is generated that achieve the 
process goals.  Systems analysis tools are used to demonstrate engagement 
system behavior. 
B. ERIKSSON-PENKER ASSEMBLY LINE MODELING  
An assembly line diagram is a tool used by business process modelers to depict 
the interaction between the business process and packages of resources.  The assembly 
line model is a useful method because it translates easily into information systems 
requirements.  Requirements are generated from the references made to the resources as 
the process progresses.  These references, when mapped to use cases (scenarios), provide 
software designers with a snapshot of system behavior.  The packages of resources can be 
thought of as objects in an information system.  "The references to the assembly line 
packages comprise information flow to and from the information system and show the 
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interface between the business process and the information system." (Eriksson and 
Penker, 116)  
The assembly line diagram consists of the business process diagram at the top of 
the model and the assembly lines of resources at the bottom.  The assembly lines are 
represented as packages of objects.  Two types of references exist.  A reference is 
considered "read," or  "write."   The "read" reference is equivalent to a process acquiring 
an instance of a resource, while a "write" reference is equivalent to a process releasing an 
instance of a resource.  Figure 4.1 depicts a generic assembly line model. 
<<Assembly Line>> A
<<Assembly Line>> B
Stereotype  of Object: Object  Written
Stereotype  of Object: Object  Read
<<Process>> <<Process>>
Process X Process Y
 
Figure (4-1) - Assembly Line Diagram (From Eriksson and Penker, 2000) 
 
B. LAND ATTACK BEHAVIORS 
1. Process-Resource 
Process-resource behavior, as demonstrated in the Assembly Line models, is 
shown in the interaction between associated sub-processes and activities and the available 
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resources.  It depicts how decision-maker resources, as control objects in the engagement 
process, use the network of decision-maker, weapon, and sensor resources to accomplish 
engagements.  The descriptions of each process from the Business Process view have 
been used to determine the types of references made to the resource packages.  The 
assembly line models and their associated reference packages are included in Appendix 
D.   
a. Network Behavior 
Decision makers conducting surface combatant land attack have access to 
a network of sensor, weapon, and decision-maker resources to conduct engagements.  
During the engagement process, the network is provided with instances of resources and 
responds to requests for instances of resources.  It must reflect the additions, deletions, 
and modifications of resources as they are consumed.  
Target information is retrieved and supplied to the network throughout the 
course of the engagement.  Higher levels of providing rather than retrieving instances of 
resources characterize the detect, decide, and assess phases.  Providing resource instances 
in these phases requires capacity and integrity.  Instances of these processes provide 
target information and decision-making in terms of collection priorities, commander's 
intent, and imaged target data.  The network receives the instances and catalogs them 
with respect to time and content.  Retrieving resource instances in these phases require 
responsiveness.  For example, an instance of the engagement process is initiated against a 
mobile surface-to-air missile battery.  The battery poses an immediate threat to advancing 
friendly aircraft.  An NSFS’s "Call for Fire" initiates the engagement.  Engage phase 
behavior is characterized by high amounts of both retrieving and providing actions.  In 
the early phases of engagement execution, the network responds to high levels of instance 
retrieval.  Decision makers and weapons need instances of target-information and sensors 
to conduct the engagement.  As weapons are launched, the network is provided with 
instances of target and battle damage assessment information. 
Networking resources mitigates environmental complexity.  The network 
is stressed and strained as the engagement process unfolds.  The need to update the 
commander's intent, access updated target information, and task sensors to collect target 
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data stresses network resources.  Factors, such as the number of engagements being 
conducted, the availability of resources, and the engagement's complexity affect how the 
engagement process executes.  A single unit conducting a strike against a group of targets 
independently stresses available resources less than multiple units engaging targets in 
support of a maneuvering force of combined air and surface forces.  Identifying the 
references to the resource network, at all points during the processes, identifies potential 
problem areas.  This understanding leads to the design of a resource network and 
associated processes that decreases the effects of those stresses and strains. 
2. Process-Event 
The type of fires required is a key portion of the land attack engagement process.  
The engagement process and the business event cycle interact to produce the desired 
results.  The interaction determines what type of supplying and controlling resources are 
available for consumption to achieve the engagement process goals. 
The Surface Combatant Land Attack CONOPS lists three types of fires utilized by 
decision makers during land attack operations.  They are: 
• Tactical Fires: Fires characterized by short response times (a few minutes 
or less).  Targets engaged with tactical fires are of an immediate threat to 
friendly forces.  These fires are delivered in proximity to friendly forces 
and require detailed coordination and integration. 
• Operational Fires:  Fires characterized by relatively short response times 
(tens of minutes).  Targets engaged with operational fires have a potential 
to threaten friendly forces.  These fires are delivered at some distance 
from friendly forces. 
• Strategic Fires:  Fires characterized by long response times (hours) 
because the targets are fixed or are not in a position to immediately 
threaten friendly forces.  These fires are delivered at a considerable 
distance from friendly forces. 
Decision makers from all levels of the land attack organization control the release 
and consumption of resources.  The "Call for Fire" business event cycle acts as an 
intermediary between the targets to be engaged and the resources available to complete 
the processes.  The rule sets defined in the business event cycle release decision-maker 
resources in the land attack organization.  Once released, the decision-maker resources 
control the consumption by releasing those additional resources necessary to conduct the 
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mission dictated by the combat situation.  The business rules defined in the event cycle 
provide a conduit through the various resources to achieve mission success. 
Two examples illustrate these effects.  Mortars and artillery engage an infantry 
company in the direction of their advance.  The company commander initiates a "Call for 
Fire."  The fire support coordination agency responds with naval gunfire.  A surface 
combatant providing direct support to the infantry company engages the target with 
tactical fires.  In a pre-emptive strike, decision makers on the Joint Targeting Control 
Board (JTCB) elect to engage fuel and ammunition dumps during the assault.  Enemy 
POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) sites, 100 nautical miles from the advancing force, 
have been detected using remote sensing from Special Operations Forces.  This mission 
requires a coordinated, dual-ship "engagement."  The "Call for Fire" is answered with 
strategic fire, in a multi-ship surface strike mission.  
Decision makers, as controlling objects in the business process, use the required 
response time and the proximity to friendly and neutral forces to determine which 
resources from the network are necessary to accomplish the engagement.   In the case of 
a target in close proximity to friendly forces that poses an immediate threat, one set of 
resources from the network is required.  A flatter decision-making hierarchy, with fewer 
constraints, is needed to ensure a speedy response.  The ability to sense the environment 
quickly and accurately is necessary to avoid fratricide.  Precision weapons with faster 
response times, such as Extended Range Guided Munitions (ERGM) rounds fired from 
naval guns rather than Tomahawk missiles, are required to eliminate the threat quickly.  
But, a stationary target, miles away from friendly and neutral forces engaged 
preemptively, requires a different set of responses.  Coordination and deconfliction 
become more important than responsiveness in decision making for this instance.  
Sensors update imagery of the target and provide local deconfliction for the firing unit.  
Because desired mission effects outweigh response times, the type of weapon used is less 
constrained.  
3. Systems-Wide 
In the last chapter, the "engagement" process and the "Call for Fire" event cycle 
are described in a linear fashion.  Unidentified entities were chosen for strategic, 
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operational, and tactical value in the decide process.  Sensor resources were consumed 
in the detect process to find them.  As a result of a "Call for Fire", the engage process 
took the detected target and launched fires at the target.  The outcome of the engagement 
was determined in the assess process.  
"Systems thinking is a discipline for seeing wholes.  It is a framework for seeing 
interrelationships rather than things, for seeing patterns of change rather than static 
'snapshots'." (Senge, 68)  Systems can be described in terms of reinforcing and balancing 
feedback loops and delays.  Reinforcing feedback is an amplifying mechanism in a 
system spawning growth or decay.  Balancing feedback serves as a mechanism to 
counteract the growth or decay and bring the system to a null state.  Time affects how 
rapidly the reinforcing feedback grows and how fast the system balances.  Analyzing the 
engagement process using these tools generates two conclusions.  First, in complex 
system, there is a tendency to take premature action to correct perceived gaps.  This 
tendency, when coupled with a shared pool of resources, has the potential to create a 
situation where, as more engagements enter the system, the shared pool of resources 
reaches a limit where quality is adversely affected.  
The land attack system is comprised of an input and output system designed to 
take corrective action based upon actual conditions.  The engagement process, as the 
corrective action in this system, acts upon targets using resources to achieve system 
goals.  The engagement sub-system is comprised of the elements of the engagement 
process.  The elements compete for network resources to accomplish missions.  As 
corrective action continues to be induced, more targets (inputs) enter the engagement 
system.  The decide and detect sub-processes consume network resources to generate 
planning and targeting to prepare for strikes.  The engage and assess sub-processes 
consume network resources to execute and assess the strikes.   
The engagement process shares a common resource pool.  As more decisions to 
engage targets enter the system, more strain is placed on these resources.  Both sub-
processes of the engagement process are designed to create increasing value and 
consume the resources necessary.  This causes the supply of resources to decrease.  As 
available resources decrease, the tendency is for the demand for resources to increase to 
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compensate.  This creates further depletion of resources.  The value generated in both 
sets of processes decrease. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter is the final view of the Business Architecture Model for Surface 
Combatant Network-Centric Land Attack Warfare.  Goals and problems, resource 
structures, and the processes associated with land attack warfare have been developed 
and explained.  This last chapter analyzed business behavior on three levels: process-
resource, process-event, and system-wide.  Tools, such as assembly-line modeling and 
systems analysis, were used to describe this behavior. 
Assembly-line modeling, chosen for its applicability to information systems, 
analyzed the business processes against resource packages.  An assembly-line model for 
each land attack process was created using sensor, weapon, decision-maker, and target-
information resources.  References were categorized and described for each process.  The 
analysis focused on how resources were consumed and developed patterns of network use 
during each phase of an engagement.  Process-event behavior analysis yielded an 
understanding of the purpose of the business event cycle in releasing the proper amount 
and degree of resources for the engagement being conducted. 
This analysis was sufficient to gain a linear understanding of the engagement 
process.  High-level systems analysis was conducted to describe the interactions between 
the processes.  Analysis concluded that in the land attack system an overall decrease in 
the quality of engagements, due to an exhaustion of shared resources, can be experienced 
because of high levels of premature corrective actions.  This behavior is attributed to the 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Business Architecture Model for Network-Centric Surface Combatant Land 
Attack Warfare is a strategic planning tool for use in C4ISR-T system development.  The 
foundation of the strategic planning process is that the business direction and 
requirements must drive the information systems direction and the computing 
architecture (Cassidy, xv).  The land attack business direction and requirements have 
been presented using the Eriksson-Penker Business Extensions tool kit for the Unified 
Modeling Language (UML).  The complexity of the land attack business direction and its 
requirements will lead to similarly complex information systems’ direction.  The land 
attack warfare processes, goals, and structures will mature as they progress to meet the 
operational requirements of 2015.  This model must mature in concert to ensure adequate 
Land Attack C4ISR-T system support. 
A. SUMMARY OF THE LAND ATTACK BUSINESS VIEWS 
The goal of creating this business architecture model was to gain an 
understanding of the land attack to develop supporting C4ISR-T systems.  This Eriksson-
Penker Business Extensions tool has depicted the land attack business using four views: 
the Business Vision, the Business Structure, the Business Process, and the Business 
Behavior.  
The Business Vision view introduced the concept of a C4ISR-T system.  These 
systems integrate sensors, weapons, and decision makers in an operating environment.  
The land-attack operating environment is complex in terms of potential geopolitical 
situations, physical operating environments and missions, and the realities of smaller 
crew sizes.  The vision view outlined the goals of conducting land attack warfare and the 
problems associated with achieving them.  Proposing changes to organization and 
doctrine have the potential to mitigate the effects of the environmental complexities. 
Organizing a force's sensors, weapons, and decision makers in a network and applying 
new organizational characteristics to land-attack command and control will aide in 
achieving a fully integrated land attack capability 
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The Business Structure and Process views depict how the business of land attack 
is conducted through resources, business processes, and events.  The Business Structure 
view organized land attack resources for network use.  Platforms conducting land attack 
provide their sensors, weapons, and decision-making resources to the network.  This view 
depicted the structure of the land attack resources in three groups: the network resources, 
the information, and the organization.  The Business Process view developed the land 
attack core processes and business event cycles.  The Process view introduced the target 
resource as the value-added resource in the engagement process. 
The Behavior View described the interaction between processes, events, and 
resources.  Behavior is shown in terms of processes and resources, processes and events, 
and the behavior of the parts as a system.  Processes and resources interact and load the 
network at various levels through the execution of the engagement process.  Processes 
and events interact to release the proper types of supplying and controlling resources to 
execute the engagement process efficiently.  As a system, the engagement process is 
described as a reinforcing growth structure that is balanced by input-output mechanisms.  
Both time delays and a common resource pool can place heavy strains on the resource 
pool that affects engagement quality. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The business architecture model has described the business direction and 
requirements and proposed operating in a network-centric architecture with improved 
organizational structures to effectively deal with a complex environment.  The future of 
land attack warfare involves overcoming complexities.  These complexities exist in the 
mission, its processes and events, and in its intended operating architecture.  Overcoming 
these complexities is a large hurdle for systems developers.  The effects of this 
complexity may be mitigated by gaining a common understanding of the business 
architecture model through further analysis of its constituent parts.    
Naval Surface Fire Support and Naval Surface Strike are complex by virtue of the 
missions they are designed to conduct.  Land attack uses sea-based fires to engage targets 
deep in the enemies' territory.  In a simple engagement, the projectile flies through the air 
at its intended target, time passes, and the projectile hits the target.  In a more complex 
50 
engagement, another projectile flies through the air at its intended target.  The projectile's 
flight path passes through a portion of airspace shared with inbound assault aircraft, time 
passes, and the projectile hits the target.  With an even more complex engagement, the 
next projectile flies through the shared airspace.  As time passes, the intended target has 
moved and the projectile hits a column of advancing friendly infantry.  Decision makers 
require information about the target, their weapons, and their surroundings.  The amount 
of information and the time constraints and accuracy involved in processing it generate 
high levels of task complexity. 
The engagement process and the "Call for Fire" event cycle introduce another 
aspect of complexity.  As modeled here, the Process View decomposed the engagement 
process into four sub-processes.  The four sub-processes contained anywhere from two to 
seven activities.  The activities can be further and further decomposed.  Each activity 
interacts with resources.  Each has specific goals and requires input objects, supplying 
objects, and controlling objects to achieve them.  The "Call for Fire" event cycle consists 
of three decision points and ten different sets of rules.  Throughout the execution of the 
engagement process, resources interact with processes; and processes interact with the 
event cycle.  The resource network is changed frequently as a result of this interaction.  
The Process and Behavior views, for simplicity, represented one target, one engagement, 
and one platform conducting it.  The complexity only grows as more platforms contribute 
and interact with the resource network, as more targets are introduced, and more 
engagements are ordered.   
The development standpoint highlights another aspect of complexity.  The 
network-centric architecture is complex.  It involves linking networks together to achieve 
a desired result.  For example, an organization has offices in Utah and Maine.  Each 
office has its own network to conduct separate tasks, but they require information and 
resource sharing between the two.  They establish a connection via the Internet to 
conduct their business. The Internet is an example of a network-centric architecture.  It is 
a network of networks designed to provide its users with information and services.  The 
land attack example is similar.  Each land attack platform has a network of sensors, 
weapons, and decision makers.  These platforms provide resources from their network to 
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a common network to complete tasks.   These platforms use the common network to 
communicate with each other, but use other outside networks to access additional 
services.  The number of networks in the land attack environment can add up quickly.  
While this architecture reduces environmental complexity by increasing the opportunity 
for collaboration and interaction, it achieves the result by creating a complex web of 
interactions.  The web of interactions requires a high level interoperability and security 
and a set of processes to ensure that it is operating in an efficient manner. 
Land Attack is a complex mission with complex processes.  A Network-Centric 
view of C4ISR-T systems is a complex solution to the problem.   The Land Attack 
CONOPS covered capabilities and systems development in the 2005-2015 timeframe.  
Various land attack programs are being developed to bring an incremental land attack 
capability to the fleet.  The business architecture model presented here is a contribution to 
the dialogue on the future of land attack warfare and its C4ISR-T system development.   
Modeling and simulation is a method for systems designers to build prototypes.  
The prototypes are used to run simulations using test parameters and conditions and test 
hypotheses.  After the simulation is complete, designers collect data, conduct analysis, 
and report on their findings.  Models can be changed and new simulations run to test new 
hypotheses.  Adverse effects can be observed and analyzed, new information gathered 
from the data, and designers can thus learn more about what they are modeling.  This 
process, when applied to the land attack business architecture model, provides an 
opportunity to achieve common ground on the direction of land attack warfare and its 
associated C4ISR-T systems.  The modeling and simulations process, combined with the 
object-oriented nature of this business modeling tool, allow systems designers to conduct 
all levels of analysis on any part of the business model.  
Land Attack Warfare is a new concept, but its elements are not.  It comprises 
traditional surface warfare missions: strike warfare and naval gunfire support.  It has 
borrowed chains of command and techniques and procedures from past and current 
operations.  It has improved upon existing technology to create new weapons systems and 
capabilities.  Smaller, lighter, and faster defense capabilities have played a major role in 
its development.  The possibilities of crew size reductions have major ramifications on 
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the task complexity and decision-making abilities.  Surface combatant land attack warfare 
will be conducted in the midst of complexity, in its environment, its organizations, its 
missions, its doctrine, its processes, and its architecture.  Robust and interoperable 
C4ISR-T systems that serve the decision makers as they operate in these increasingly 
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APPENDIX A - BUSINESS VISION VIEW 
Appendix A includes UML diagrams and descriptions of the goal/problem model 
associated with Surface Combatant Land Attack (LA) in a Network Centric Environment.  
This appendix contains two sections.  The goal section includes a UML class/object 
diagram and an explanation of the goals associated with land attack.  Each goal is 
described in terms of its type, description, and dependence.  A brief narrative explanation 
and diagrams of the goal follows.  The problem section explains each problem associated 
with conducting surface combatant land attack in terms of its associated goal, a 
description of the problem, its causes, actions to remedy the problem, and prerequisites 
for the remedial actions. 
The goal/problem model depicts a specific goal as an object of the goal class. 
Super-goals may be completely or partially broken down into sub-goals and the 
constraint {complete} or {incomplete} describes this characteristic.  A goal is 
constrained as {complete} when the goal has been completely broken down into 
subordinate goals.  When all subordinate goals have been completed, the super-goal is 
achieved.  A goal is constrained as {incomplete} when the goal has not been completely 
broken down into sub-goals.  This may indicate that other events might be necessary to 
fulfill the goal even if all sub-goals are achieved. 
The goal/problem model also describes the obstacles to achieving the business 
goal in the form of problems.  Problems may be temporary, in that they might be solved 
once and for all, or they may be permanent problems, which may only be mitigated.  
Action plans may be developed for problems in the form of causes, actions to solve, 
prerequisites for those actions, and processes required solving them. 
A. GOAL DESCRIPTION 
1. Land Attack Capability (G1)  
G1:   Land Attack Capability 
Goal Type:   Qualitative 
Description:   Integrate employment of LA process 
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   Project Combat power 
   Protect national interests 
   Achieve national and military objectives 
Dependence:   Yes 
Complete/Incomplete: Incomplete 
Narrative:  The land attack capability has been defined in the Land Attack 
CONOPS as the integrated employment of available sensors, weapons, and forces (joint 
or coalition).  The employment of these resources is used to project combat power into 
the ground portion of the battle space.  The use of combat power must be in support of 
the national interest and of sufficient strength to achieve national and military objectives 
2. Integrative Land Attack Capability (G1.1) (Figure A-1) 
G1.1 :  Integrated Land Attack Capability 
Goal Type:  Qualitative 
Description:  Level of conflict: Strategic, Operational, Tactical  
 Type of resource:  Sensor, weapon, decision maker 
Dependence:  G1.1.1 Dynamic Battle Management 
   G1.1.2 Firepower 
   G1.1.3 Forces 
   G1.1.4 Execution 
Complete/Incomplete: Incomplete 
Narrative:  Land attack is conducted at all levels of conflict.  Resources in the 
form of sensors, weapons, and decision makers exist at all levels of conflict.  An 
integrated land attack capability removes the coupling between the decision-maker, 
sensor, and weapon.  Removing the coupling and making sensing (sensor), deciding 
(decision-making), and acting (weapons) a function of the network of resources available 
for use in a conflict adds value to the process.  Integrating the land attack capability 


















Figure (A-1) - Integrated Land Attack Capability 
3. Dynamic Battle Management (G1.1.1) (Figure A-2) 
G1.1.1:  Dynamic Battle Management 
Goal Type:  Qualitative 
Description:  Support precise and scalable massed fires 
Dependence:  G1.1.1.1 Near Real Time Battlespace Deconfliction 
   G1.1.1.2 Simultaneous Fire and Maneuver 
G1.1.1.3 Situational Awareness of multi-warfare tactical 
picture 
G1.1.1.4 Control of resources in the battlespace 
Complete/Incomplete: Incomplete 
Narrative:  Dynamic battle management must support precise and scalable massed 
fires. Land attack is conducted in conjunction with maneuvering forces.  This requires 
situational awareness of the multi-warfare tactical picture that allows the commander to 
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control resources in support of the mission objectives.   Precision and scalability of fires 
















Figure (A-2) - Dynamic Battle Management 
4. Fire Power (G1.1.2) (Figure A-3) 
G1.1.2:   Fire-Power 
Goal Type:   Qualitative/Quantitative 
Description: Allocated dynamically from a network-based 
architecture 
Dependence:   G1.1.2.1 Dynamically allocated 
    G1.1.2.2 Precision Fires 
G1.1.2.3 Scalable Fires 
Complete/Incomplete:  Incomplete 
Narrative:  Fires are logically removed from platforms and are consumed as a 
network resource.  Networking available fires allows them to be dynamically allocated to 
achieve synchronization between firing units.  Dynamic allocation provides precision 
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engagement with properly scaled fires to achieve mission objectives.  Dynamic 
allocation, precision, and scalability of fires have quantitative values associated with 
them.  System response-time required by the maneuver commander is two and a half 
minutes from target detection to weapons away. Precision goals are between 750 and 
1000 m CEP (Circular Error Probability) to friendly forces and 20-50 m CEP to targets.  







Figure (A-3) - Firepower 
5. Forces (G1.1.3) (Figure A-4) 
 G1.1.3:  Forces 
Goal Type:  Qualitative 
Description:  Allocated dynamically from a network-based architecture 
Dependence:  G1.1.3.1 Offensive 
   G1.1.3.2 Integrated  
G1.1.3.3 Sea-Based 
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G1.1.4.4 Primary means of engagement 
Complete/Incomplete:  Incomplete 
Narrative: Land attack forces must be able to conduct prompt, sustained, and 
synchronized operations.  These operations will be conducted with combinations of 
tailored forces to specific roles and missions.  The forces must have assured access and 








Figure (A-4) - Forces 
6. Execution (G1.1.4) (Figure A-5) 
G1.1.4:  Execution 
Goal Type:  Qualitative 
Description:   Executed at the lowest possible echelon   
Dependence:  G1.1.4.1 Strategic level 
   G1.1.4.2 Operational level 
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G1.1.4.3 Tactical level 
G1.1.4.4 "Sensor to weapons on target" timeline  
Complete/Incomplete:  Incomplete 
Narrative: Land attack must be executed at the lowest echelons of command.  
Increases in the speed of command gained through a network-centric architecture are 
used to capture the element of speed and surprise.  A "sensor to weapons on target" 
timeline respects the nature of the mission and its place in the hierarchy of operations.  
"Time-critical targets have importance from a tactical, operational, or strategic 
perspective and can be found throughout the battlespace." (Network Centric Operations- 
Time Critical Strike CONOPS, 2-3)  Executing time critical strikes requires coordination 
and synchronization between independent, joint, and combined forces.  Execution then 
requires the capability to share resources across echelons of command to ensure timely 









Figure (A-5) - Execution 
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B. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
1. Environmental Dynamics 
Problem: Environmental Dynamics (Figure A-6) 
Associated Goal: LA Goal (G1) 
Description: A hypothetical closing of the Straits of Hormuz provides a context in 
which to observe environmental complexity in various forms.  The closing creates a 
geopolitical situation that is unacceptable to the United States.  The Straits of Hormuz is 
a vital world-shipping lane.  The ability for merchant vessels to pass through unimpeded 
is of a major concern to the global economy.  The United States and its allies respond to 
the situation with a mission to reclaim the Straits. A MEF size assault is planned to free 
the Straits.  The battle space is characterized by its proximity to land, volume of friendly 
troop movements, coordination and deconfliction of friendly fires supporting the 
movement ashore, and unit self-defenses and the protection of high-value units.   
Causes: Global economic and social interdependency has made the free flow of 
commerce over the world's oceans a top priority.  The US presence in the littorals aids in 
keeping these waterways open to global shipping traffic.  The development of doctrines 
such as Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver 
(STOM) capitalize on speed, volume, and the element of surprise to achieve 
overwhelming force in the face of adversaries.  This capability requires that supporting 
units, with increasingly smaller crew sizes, have the tools necessary to operate in this 
complex environment. 
Actions:   Organizational Change.   
Doctrinal Change 



















Figure (A-6) - Environmental Complexity 
 
2. Organizational Change 
Problem:   Organizational Change (Figure A-7) 
Associated Goal: Forces (G1.1.3) 
Description: A fully integrated land attack capability in a network-centric 
environment increases the speed of command.  Speed of command flattens command 
hierarchies and places decision makers in parallel with weapons and sensors (CONOPS, 
2-1).  Targets engaged with fires may be in support of maneuvering or independent of 
them.  The command structure placed on weapons, sensors, and decision makers affects 
how these operations are conducted. 
Causes: Command structures are in place to control the outcome of events in 
battle.  Command and control comprises authority, responsibility, and intent.  Authority, 
responsibility, and intent bound the mission and its objectives.  Land attack is conducted 
at all three levels of conflict: strategic, operational, and tactical.  
Actions: Current organizational structures and rules, with regard to fires in both 
the surface strike and surface fire support roles, should be reviewed and aligned with the 
goals of a network-centric architecture. 
Prerequisites: Generate characteristics of information-age organizations and apply 


















Figure (A-7) - Organizational Change 
 
3. Doctrinal Change  
Problem:  Fundamental Doctrinal Change (Figure A-8) 
Associated Goals: Execution (G1.1.4) and Dynamic Battle Management (G1.1.1) 
Description: A fully integrated land attack capability in a network-centric 
architecture requires a dynamic battle management capability that provides commanders 
with full visibility of force weapons, sensors, and decision-making.  The degree of 
environmental complexity present in land attack scenarios requires commanders to be 
proactive in their decision-making processes.  Maintaining situational awareness in these 
highly complex scenarios is challenging.  
Causes: The land attack mission definitions have increased the degree of 
complexity in the commander's environment.  At-sea commanders in the naval surface 
strike roles are responsible for the planning, controlling, coordinating, execution, and 
assessment of surface-strike munitions both for their own units as well as those assigned 
in support.  Units must be able to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance for the force 
with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and process, display, and disseminate that 
information to other forces in the operating areas.  At-sea commanders conducting naval 
surface fires support missions have the use of long-range, deep penetration, guided 
munitions for use in support of maneuvering forces ashore.  The speed and mass of the 
maneuvering force as it proceeds ashore, the mass of fires required in support of the 
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maneuver, and the command and control relationships between a firing unit and a 
supported unit increase the need for rapid and dynamic command and control.  
Actions:  Precision and scalability in fires and forces requires units to operate in a 
networked fashion.  Network-centric warfare is expected to provide more than a rapid 
and dynamic picture of the battle space.  Placing decision makers, sensors, and weapons 
in parallel adds value to battle management by distributing the decision-making ability, 
weapons pairings, and forces across a wider area. 
Prerequisites: Network-centric warfare must be applied to the land attack mission 
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APPENDIX B - BUSINESS STRUCTURE VIEW 
The Business Structure View is comprised of three models: the resource model, 
the information model, and the organization model.  UML class/object diagrams 
represent each of the land attack resource models.  While they are represented in a 
physical hierarchy on the page, logically they are not hierarchic.  The utility of the 
class/object diagrams is that the diagrams represent inheritance and specificity.  For 
example, the Weapons Class resource has two objects associated with it: fires and 
electronic warfare.  The fires and electronic warfare classes have specific instances that 
represent weapons and associated weapon systems.  Associations are depicted between 
objects and instances by intervals listed on the connecting lines and by name.  Each 
association is represented by a multiplicity, depicting the minimum number and 
maximum number of the relationship.  
A. RESOURCE MODEL 
The resource model categorizes resources for use in network-centric land attack 
warfare.  Descriptions of the resources are found in the Business Structure View.  The 











Figure (B-1) - Land Attack Resources 
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1. Decision-Maker Resources 
Decision-maker resources exist at all three levels of conflict (Figure B-1).  They 
are presented in this section in class-object diagrams depicting the types of decision-
maker resources available at each level of conflict.  They have been decomposed into 
strategic, operational, and tactical decision makers (Figures B-2 - B-6).  The operational 
and tactical decision makers have been decomposed to reflect the specifics of the land 







































ARG- Amphibious Ready Group
CATF- Commander Amphibious Task Force
CLF- Commander Landing Force
TSC- Tomahawk Strike Coordinator  









SACC- Supporting Arms Coordination Center
FFCC-  Force Fires Coordination Center
LAC- Tomahawk Launch Area Coordinator
LA CIC Team- Land Attack Combat Information Center
   Team
LA CIC Team LA CIC Team
 
 
Figure (B-5) - Tactical Decision Makers 
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SACC
TIC NGFLFFSC Air Support
TIC- Target Information Center
LFFSC-  Landing Force Fire Suuport Coordination Center
NGF- Naval Gunfire Section  
 
Figure (B-6) - Supporting Arms Coordination Center 
2. Sensors 
Sensors provide target data for the engagement process.  They have been 
categorized as surveillance, detection and tracking, and reconnaissance assets (Figures  
B-7 - B-10).  Some sensors are organic to the land attack force, such as shipboard radar 

















TLDHS LLDR Firefinder Radar
TLDHS- Target Handling Designation Handoff System









Rivet Joint JSTARS ARL
JSTARS- Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
ARL- Airborne Reconnaissance, Low
Rivet Joint- Airborne COMINT/ELINT collector  




UAV SOF National Space Assets
UAV-Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
SOF- Special Operations Forces  




Weapons are classified in three categories: Fires, Maneuver Forces, and 
Electronic Warfare (Figures B-11 - B-13).  Fires and maneuver forces have been further 
decomposed in the following figures.  The classification of this work precludes a 

















CAS-  Close Air Support
LAM- Land Attack Missiles
TACTOM-Tactical Tomahawk












AAAV-Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle
LCAC-Landing Craft Air Cushion
AAAV Fixed Wing Helicopters
 
 
Figure (B-13) - Maneuver Forces 
B. INFORMATION MODEL 
The information model consists of six classes (Figure B-14).  They are defined as 
follows: 
• Planning: Planning information is required in determining mission 
objectives and formulating commander's intent and rules of engagement.  
Planning information includes data about existing threats.  It affects where 
firing units are placed and their ammunition load-outs.  Planning 
information is affected by executed and assessed engagements.  
• Targeting: Targeting information provides decision makers with the data 
required to target and plan firing missions.  Targeting information includes 
what is to be targeted, whether it is detected, and what type of target it is.  
Targeting information also provides a priority for engagement based upon 
the target type.   
• Coordination: Coordination information is used between firing units in 
coordinating existing plans.  Coordination information includes spotter 
position, role of the firing unit, its condition, and its ability to carry out an 
assigned firing mission. 
• Deconflcition: Deconfliction information is concerned primarily with an 
engagement.  Deconfliction information provides a decision-maker with 
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the placement of friendly and neutral units as they relate to the 
engagement.  Deconfliction information also aids decision makers in 
managing target lists by depicting the status of the target and the firing 
unit engaging it. 
• Execution: Execution information depicts the specifics of the 
engagement.  Fire mission information includes time, target number, 
location, description, and method of engagement.  Execution information 
includes a firing report and the mission effects used in engaging the target. 
• Assessment: Upon completion of an engagement, assessment information 
is generated.  Assessment information includes battle damage assessment, 
re-attack plans, and the status of the re-attack.  Assessment information is 












Figure (B-14) - Land Attack Information Model 
 
C. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE MODEL 
The organization model decomposes the land attack organization from the unified 
command level to the individual commander aboard a ship or assault element (Figures B-
15 - B-21). 
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Strategic























JFC- Joint Force Commander
JFSOCC- Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander
JFACC- Joint Force Air Component Commander
JTSG- Joint Targeting Steering Group
JFMCC- Joint Force Maritime Component Commander  
 




CATF CLF BG CDR
NCC- Naval Component Commander
CATF- Commander Amphibious Task Force
CLF- Commander Landing Force
BG CDR- Battle Group Commander  




MEF SAG CDR TSC
MEFCDR- Marine Expeditionary Force Commander
SAG CDR- Surface Action Group Commander
TSC- Tomahawk Strike Coordinator  
 




MEFCDR- Marine Expeditionary Force Commander
GCE- Ground Combat Element
ACE- Air Combat Element
SSG- Service Support Group  
 




SHIP CO SHIP CO
SAGCDR- Surface Action Group Commander
LA- Land Attack
CIC- Combat Information Center
LA CIC TEAM LA CIC TEAM
 





APPENDIX C - BUSINESS PROCESS VIEW 
This appendix provides the models and descriptions of the land attack business 
rules and process. 
A. BUSINESS RULES 
The Eriksson-Penker business notation represents business events as classes and 
objects in a generalization hierarchy to depict their relationships.  The Business Event 
cycle is modeled as a class-hierarchy.  The "Call for Fire" is comprised of ten sub-events, 
in three tiers.  The first tier of the hierarchy consists of the Naval Surface Fire Support 
and Naval Surface Strike Events.  This tier of events specifies the "Call for Fire" method.  
The second tier consists of events that further specify the "Call for Fire" method.  The 
third tier business events are specific to the NSFS "Call for Fire".  These events provide 
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Figure (C-2) - Land Attack Business Events (Part II) 
A key portion of the business event cycle is the decision matrix.  The business 
event cycle consists of four decision points and ten rules.  Once negotiated, rules are 
applied to the engagement that control how the engagement process unfolds.  Figures C-3 









NSS- Naval Surface Strike


























GS/R - General Support, Reinforcing
 
Figure (C-4) - Land Attack Decision-Points (Part II) 
 
Table C-1 relates decision-points to the rule sets.  The decision matrix is 
explained in the text following the matrix. 
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Business Event Decision Point Rule Set












Table (C-1) – LA Business Event/Rule Set Matrix 
 
1. Decision Point: DP-1 
Title:  Call For Fire Type 
Criteria:  Is the engagement in support of maneuvering forces? 
Result:  Yes, then generate NSFS business event.   
No, then generate NSS business event. 
2. Rule Set: A  
Title: Naval Surface Strike Rules 
Description: Naval Surface Strike is conducted independently of 
maneuvering forces.  Platforms conducting NSS must be capable of 
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planning, targeting, controlling, coordinating, deconflicting, executing 
and assessing own-ship fires as a single platform or group of 
platforms.  Platforms receive mission orders, commander's guidance, 
and rules of engagement from higher authority with no higher-level 
on-scene commander available in the area of operation. 
3. Rule Set:  B 
Title:  Naval Surface Fire Support Rules 
Description: Naval Surface Fire Support will be conducted in support 
of maneuvering forces ashore.  Platforms conducting NSFS must be 
capable of receiving, processing, and controlling calls for fire from fire 
support coordination agencies and forward observers ashore.  
Platforms will operate in a support or control role. 
4. Decision Point: DP-1.1 
Title:   NSFS Type 
Criteria:  Is the platform individually receiving firing orders from a 
fire support coordination agency?  
Is the platform directing and controlling the fires of multiple 
platforms? 
Result: If platform is individually receiving firing orders from a fire 
support coordination agency, then the platform is operating as a 
supporting unit.   
If the platform is directing and controlling the fires of multiple 
platforms, then the platform is operating as a controlling unit 
5. Rule Set: C 
Title:  Supporting Unit Rules 
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Description:  Supporting units receive calls for fire from fire support 
coordination agencies and forward observers.  Calls for fire are 
executed in accordance with the rules of fire support 
6. Rule Set: D 
Title:  Controlling Unit Rules 
Description: Controlling units direct and control fires of multiple 
platforms.  Controlling units receive calls for fire from fire support 
coordination agencies, process the requests in accordance with 
commander's intent, and assign one or more platforms assigned the 
requested fires. 
7. Decision Point:  DP-1.2 
Title:  NSS  Type 
Criteria: Is the firing platform operating independently or as a part 
of a multiple platform group? 
Result: If the platform is operating independently, then platform is 
operating in the single ship role.   
If the platform is operating as part of a multiple ship group, then the 
platform is operating in the multi-ship role. 
8. Rule Set: E 
Title: Single Ship Rules 
Description: Platforms operating in the single ship mode must be able 
to plan, target, control, coordinate, deconflict, execute, and assess 
own-ship fires.  The single ship will receive mission orders, 
commander's guidance, and rules of engagement from higher 
authority.  The single unit must be able to execute missions using 
organic and inorganic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.  
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The platform will have the authority to determine which targets to 
engage, with what weapons, and to what degree.  
9. Rule Set: F 
Title: Multi-Ship Rules 
Description: Platforms operating in multi-ship role must be able to 
conduct single-ship missions.  In addition, platforms must be able to 
complete those tasks for a group of platforms operating in concert. 
10. Decision Point:  DP-1.1.1 
Title:  Support Type 
Criteria: Is the unit providing fire support to the force to a specific 
unit?  
Is the unit providing fire support to the force as a whole?   
Is the unit providing fires to a unit that is providing fire support to a 
specific unit?   
Is the unit providing fire support to the force as a whole and providing 
fires to a unit that is providing fire support to a specific unit? 
Result.  If the unit is providing fire support to a specific unit, then the 
unit is providing direct support.   
If the unit is providing fire support to the force as a whole, then the 
unit is providing general support.   
If the unit is providing fires to a unit that is providing fire support to a 
specific unit, then the unit is reinforcing.   
If the unit is providing fire support to the force as a whole and 
providing fires to a unit that is providing fire support to a specific unit, 
then the unit is providing general support-reinforcing. 
11. Rule Set: G 
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Title:  DS Rules 
Description:  Direct Support (DS) missions require a unit to provide 
close supporting fires to a specific unit. 
12. Rule Set: H 
Title: GS Rules 
Description:  General Support (GS) missions require a unit to provide 
support to the force as a whole. 
13. Rule Set: I 
Title: R Rules 
Description: Reinforcing (R) missions require a unit to provide fires to 
a unit that is providing direct support to another unit.  The DS unit will 
use the fires of the reinforcing unit to augment its support to the 
supported unit. 
14. Rule Set:  J 
Title: GS-R Rules 
Description: General Support-Reinforcing missions require a unit to 
provide general support to the force as a whole, while providing 
reinforcing fires to a unit acting in direct support of a supported unit as 
its secondary priority. 
B. BUSINESS PROCESS 
Targets are created and destroyed in the "engagement" process through a series of 
sub-processes and activities.  For the purposes of the development of the "engagement" 
process, "engagement" has been considered a macro-process consisting of the elements of 
the time-critical strike decision cycle.  The elements (detect, decide, engage, assess) have 
been considered processes (Figures C5 and C6).  They have been decomposed into sub-
processes and activities.  Each process is listed below in terms of sub-processes, 
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activities, input objects, supply objects, control objects, goal objects, output objects, and a 

































 Process: Detect (P.1) (Figures C7-13) 
Associated Sub-Processes: Cue (P.1.1), Assess (P.1.2), Task-Collect 
(P.1.3), Exploit (P.1.4), Nominate (P.1.5) 
Associated Activities: Select Cueing Criteria (A.1.1.), Fuse and 
Correlate Sensor Data (A.1.2), Develop Collection Plan (A.1.3), 
Disseminate Updated Collection Guidance (A.1.3.1), Target Confirmation 
(A.1.4), Target Information Sharing (A.1.5) 
Input Object:  Physical Target 
Supply Object:  Sensor 
Control Object: Decision-Maker 
Goal Object:  Dynamic Battle-Manangement 
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Figure (C-13) - Detect Activity Diagram 
 
2.  Decide 
 Process: Decide (P.2) (Figures C14-22) 
Associated Sub-Processes: Prioritize (P.2.1), Weapons-Target-Platform Match 
(P.2.2), Decide (P.2.3), Coordinate and Deconflict (P.2.4), Update Mission 
Planning (P.2.5), Weaponeering (P.2.6), Task (P.2.7) 
Associated Activities: Establish Commander's Guidance (A.2.1), Establish 
Target List (A.2.1), Evaluate Target List (A.2.1), Review Target (A.2.2), Review 
Weapon (A.2.2), Review Platform (A.2.2), Consult Commander's Guidance 
(A.2.3), Consult ROE (A.2.3), Execute Decision (A.2.3), Deconflict Strike 
(A.2.4), Synchronize Strike (A.2.4), Update Target (A.2.5), Update Mission 
(A.2.5), Specify Aim-points (A.2.6), Specify Weapon (A.2.6), Specify Platform 
(A.2.7) 
Input Objects:  Target Information 
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Supply Objects:  Decision -Maker, Target Information 
Controlling Objects: Decision-Maker 
Goal Object:   Execution 
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Figure (C-22) - Decide Activity Diagram 
 
3.  Engage 
Process: Engage (P.3) (Figures C23-24) 
Associated Sub-Processes: Execution (P.3.1), Plan for Combat Assessment 
(P.3.2) 
Associated Activities: None 
Input Object:  Target Information 
Supply Object:  Weapon, Sensor 
Control Object:  Decision-Maker 
Goal Object:   Firepower 



























Figure (C-24) - Engage Activity Diagram 
4.  Assess 
Process:  Assess (P.4) (Figures C25-30) 
Associated Sub-Processes: Cue (P.4.1), Assess (P.4.2), Task-Collect (P.4.3), 
Exploit (P.4.4), Nominate (P.4.5) 
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Associated Activities: Select Cueing Criteria (A.4.1.), Fuse and Correlate Sensor 
Data (A.4.2) , Develop Collection Plan (A.4.3), Disseminate Updated Collection 
Guidance(A.4.3.), Target Confirmation (A.4.4), Target Information Sharing 
(A.4.5) 
Input Object:  Physical Target 
Supply Object:  Sensor 
Control Object: Decision-Maker 
Goal Object:   Dynamic Battle-Management 
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APPENDIX D - BUSINESS BEHAVIOR VIEW 
Business behavior is depicted using assembly line modeling and systems analysis.  
Appendix D provides a description of the assembly line models and reference packages.   
A. PROCESS-RESOURCE 
Process-resource behavior is captured in assembly line modeling.  The reference 
packages represent behavior between the engagement process and the network of 
resources.  Each reference package is presented along with its assembly line diagram. 
1. Decide 
Reference Package 1 (Figure D-1) 
1.  Reference: Establish Commander's Guidance (R1.1) 
Type:  Write 
Package Referenced:  Decision-Maker 
Description:  Land attack operations are conducted in accordance with 
established commander's guidance.  
2.  Reference: Establish Target List (R1.2) 
Type: Write 
Package Referenced: Target - Information 
Description: The target list is established with relative priority.  These are the 
targets, which enter the engagement process and the target acquisition to weapon-
delivery time line. 
3.  Reference: Establish Attack Guidance Matrix (R1.3) 
Type: Write 
Package Referenced: Target-Information 
Description: An established attack guidance matrix provides decision makers a 












Figure (D-1) - "Decide" Assembly Line Diagram 
 
2. Detect 
Reference Package 2 (Figure D-2)     
1.  Reference: Set Collection Priorities (R2.1) 
Type: Write 
Package Referenced: Target-Information 
Referenced By: Decision-Maker  
Description: Collection priorities must be disseminated to all decision makers.  
Tasking and collecting target data will be based upon the priorities set by decision 
makers with this reference 
2.  Reference: Task-Collect (R2.2) 
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Type: Write 
Package Referenced: Sensor 
Description: Sensors will be tasked to collect target data based upon collection 
priorities. 
3.  Reference: Fuse - Correlate (R2.3) 
Type: Read 
Package Referenced: Sensor 
Description:  Raw target data is read from the sensor package and evaluated. 
4.  Reference: Target Confirmation (R2.4) 
Type: Write 
Package Referenced: Target Information 
Discussion: Decision makers, using the fused and correlated target information, 
confirm the target information as the desired targets for use in the engagement 
process. 
5.  Reference: Target Information Sharing (R2.5) 
Type: Write 
Package Referenced: Target-Information 
Description:  The target confirmation information is placed in the target 
information package.  Any decision-maker may reference this target information 
during the engagement process. 
6.  Reference: Update Collection Priorities (R2.6) 
Type: Write 
Package Referenced: Target-Information 
Referenced By: Decision-Maker 
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Description: Collection priorities are continually updated throughout the assault.  
As the operational and tactical situation changes, collection priorities will be 
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Figure (D-2) - "Decide" Assembly Line Diagram 
3.  Engage 
Reference Package 3 (Figure D-3) 
1.  Reference: Consult Attack Guidance Matrix (R3.1) 
Type: Read 
Package Referenced: Target-Information 
Description: Decision-maker references the attack guidance matrix for appropriate 
information. 
2.  Reference: Execute (R3.2) 
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Type: Write 
Package Referenced: Weapon 
Description:  Target is engaged with weapon in accordance with attack guidance. 
3.  Reference: Target (R3.3) 
Type:  Read 
Package Referenced: Target-Information 
Referenced by: Weapon 
Description: Weapon retrieves target-information for target to be engaged 
4.  Reference: Execute (R3.4) 
Type: Write 
Package Referenced: Target-Information 
Description: Weapon is launched. 
5.  Reference: Plan BDA (R3.5) 
Type: Write 
Package Referenced: Decision-Maker 
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Figure (D-3) - "Engage" Assembly Line 
 
4.  Assess 
Reference Package 4 (Figure D-4) 
1.  Reference: Conduct BDA (R4.1) 
Type: Write 
Package Referenced: Decision-Maker 
Description: Sensor resources collect battle damage assessment 
2.  Reference: Task-Collect (R4.2) 
Type: Write 
Package Referenced: Sensor 
112 
Description: Sensors will be tasked to collect target data based upon collection 
priorities. 
3.  Reference: Fuse -Correlate (R4.3) 
Type: Read 
Package Referenced: Sensor 
Description: Raw target data is read from the sensor package and evaluated. 
4.  Reference: Target Confirmation (R4.4) 
Type: Write 
Package Referenced: Target-Information 
Description: Decision makers, using the fused and correlated target information, 
confirm the target information as the desired targets for use in the engagement 
process. 
5.  Reference: Target Information Share (R4.5) 
Type: Write 
Package Referenced: Target-Information 
Discussion: The target confirmation information is placed in the target 
information package.  Any decision-maker may reference this target information 
during the engagement process. 
6.  Reference: Update Commander's Guidance (R4.6) 
Type: Write 
Package Referenced: Decision-Maker 
Description: Update commander's guidance to reflect changes in the operational 
and/or tactical situation. 
7. Reference: Update Collection Priorities (R4.7) 
Type: Write 
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Package Referenced: Decision-Maker 
Description: Collection priorities are continually updated throughout the assault.  
As the operational and tactical situation changes, collection priorities will be 
updated in order to schedule sensor resources. 
8.  Reference: Update Target Information (R4.8) 
Type: Write 
Package Referenced: Target-Information 
Description: Update Attack Guidance Matrix and target priority lists to reflect 







Objec t W rite
R3.1 R3.2 R3.3 R3.4 R3.5
 




LIST OF REFERENCES 
Alberts, D. Garstka, J, and Stein, F (1999).  Network Centric Warfare, Developing and 
Leveraging Information Superiority, Washington D.C.: CCRP Press. 
 
Brown, S and Eisenhardt, K.  (1998).  Competing on the Edge of Chaos, Massachusetts:  
Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Cassidy, A.  (1998).  A Practical Guide to Information Systems Strategic Planning, 
Florida:  CRC Press LLC. 
 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.  (2000).  Joint Vision 2020.  
 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.  (2000).  "Overview of National Security Strategy", 
www.dtic.mil/jcs.  
 
Chief of Naval Operations.  (1997). "From the Sea…Forward from the 
Sea".www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/ffseanoc.html 
 
CONOPS and Doctrine WIPT (2001).  Concept of Operations for Surface Combatant 
Land Attack Warfare, 2005-2015.  N764J.   The Pentagon, Washington D.C. 
 
CONOPS WIPT (2001).  Concept of Operations for Time Critical Strike. 
 
Eriksson, H and Penker, M.  (2000).  Business Modeling with UML, Business Patterns at 
Work, Canada: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
 
Hodge, B., Anthony, W. Gales, L (1990).  Organization Theory, A Strategic Approach, 
5th Ed.  New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
 
Jones, C.R., Jansen, E., Brady, T.  (2000).  The DOD View and Command and Control.  
Class Notes presented in CC3000, Naval Post-Graduate School.   
 
Kanter, R.  (1995).  “Mastering Change.”  In S. Chawla and J. Rensch (Ed.), Learning 
Organizations, Developing Cultures for Tomorrow's Workplace (pp. 71-83).  Oregon:  
Productivity Press. 
 
Maxfield, R.R. (1999).  “Complexity and Organization Management.”  Complexity, 
Global Politics, and National Security.  
http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/books/complexity/ch.08.htm 
 
Rosenau, J. (1997).  Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier, Exploring Governance in a 
Turbulent World, United Kingdom:  Cambridge University Press. 
115 
Senge, P. (1990).  The Fifth Discipline, The Art and Practice of the Learning 
Organization, New York:  Doubleday/Currency. 
 
Wise, J.  (2000).  “Fire Mission, Naval Surface Fire Support in the 21st Century.”  
Surface Warfare, Vol. 25, No. 3., pp. 4-7. 
116 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Monterey, CA  93943-5101 
 
3. LT William K. Shafley III 
3366 Arnett CT. 
Westerville, OH  43081 
 
 
4. Dr. Erik Jansen 
Naval Post Graduate School 
 
5. Dr. Floyd Brock 
Naval Post Graduate School 
 
6. Dr. Carl Jones 
Naval Post Graduate School 
 
7. Dr. Dan Boger 
Naval Post Graduate School 
 
8. CAPT Robert Jenkins 
Strategic Studies Group 
 
9. CDR Joe Shaw 
Land Attack Training Requirements 
 
 
 
117 
